ALIENATING ALIENS: EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS IN
THE STRUCTURES OF STATE PUBLIC-BENEFIT SCHEMES
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INTRODUCTION

On July 28, 2009, Hawaii’s Department of Human Services an1
nounced its plan to cease enrolling certain legally residing aliens in
its federally supported Medicaid programs and to disenroll aliens al2
ready covered by the programs. Letters soon went out to the affected population, informing them that they would be switched to a solely state-funded insurance program called “Basic Health Hawaii.”
That new program would provide a limited number of outpatient vis3
its, inpatient hospital days, and prescriptions. But the switch to Basic
Health Hawaii eliminated coverage for life-saving treatments—
including dialysis and chemotherapy—that Hawaii’s resident aliens
were receiving through Medicaid.
Hawaii has not been the only state to reduce or altogether elimi4
nate public benefits for its legally residing alien population. Several
states have turned to such health benefit reductions (as well as elimi-
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J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., American University. I am grateful to Janet Alexander for
very helpful comments on early drafts, to Jenna Sheldon-Sherman for invaluable advice
on structure and clarity, and to Garrison Cox for lending his editing acumen. I also thank
the staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their hard work on this Article.
I use this term to refer generally to aliens that have some form of documented legal status. Specific categories of alien status are reviewed below in Part I.B.
News Release, Hawai’i Dep’t of Human Servs., DHS Moving Non-Citizen Adults into New
Medical Assistance Program, ‘Basic Health Hawai’i,’ on September 1 (July 28, 2009) (on
file with author).
Complaint at Exhibit B, Sound v. Koller, No. CV09-00409, (D.Haw. Aug. 31, 2009), 2010
WL 1992198, sub nom. Korab v. Koller, No. CV10-00483 (D.Haw. Aug. 23, 2010).
See, e.g., Act of Feb. 18, 2011, ch. 5, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws § 271 (amending 2010 Wash.
Sess. Laws § 212) (restricting alien eligibility for Washington State Basic Health program); 2011 Me. Laws 580 (terminating health benefit coverage to certain resident aliens); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:78-3.2 (2010) (restricting alien eligibility for NJ FamilyCare
Program, which offers subsidized health insurance to low-income adults and children);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 65, § 31 (2009) (restricting alien eligibility for the Commonwealth
Care Health Insurance Program); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1224 (Md. 2006) (describing the state’s failure to appropriate funds for medical benefits to certain resident alien children and pregnant women while funding similar benefits to citizens).
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5

nating other types of welfare benefits ) as a way of containing costs in
6
light of budgetary pressures. Facing the potentially dire conse7
quences that would follow from losing such critical benefits, legally
residing aliens in many of these states have filed lawsuits seeking injunctions against the restrictive measures. A common thread
through each of these lawsuits is the claim that the state has violated
8
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Article is the first to broadly review the decisions of state and
federal courts that have addressed aliens’ equal protection challenges
to their exclusions from state-run public-benefit programs. As courts
9
and scholars have recognized, these lawsuits present a difficult ques5
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See, e.g., Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the elimination of Washington’s Food Program for Legal Immigrants); Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Mass. 2002) (recounting certain aliens’ ineligibility for the state’s “transitional aid to families with dependent children” (TAFDC) proprogram).
See, e.g., Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 977
(Mass. 2012) (describing the “drastically reduced revenue estimate” that motivated state
lawmakers to cut benefits for resident aliens); Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d 451, 461 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (noting the state’s estimate of $20 million in Fiscal Year 2011
savings from the disenrollment of resident aliens from NJ FamilyCare and an additional
$24.6 million in Fiscal Year 2011 savings from the non-enrollment of aliens not already
enrolled in the benefit program).
For instance, the plaintiffs in Sound, 2010 WL 1992198, did not know whether they would
continue receiving life-saving treatments after August 31, 2009, the last day they were to
be enrolled in the comprehensive Medicaid programs. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 7.
Most plaintiffs were dialysis patients for whom death could have come as early as five days
from their last treatment. Id. at Declaration of Dr. Neal A. Palafox. After pressure
mounted from a series of marches, a sit-in in Governor Linda Lingle’s office, and lawsuits,
Hawaii’s Department of Human Services announced that the state found a source of $1.5
million in federal funds to cover dialysis treatments for certain resident aliens as an
emergency service for the next two years. State Finds $1.5M for Dialysis, HAW. STARBULLETIN (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/content/
20090901_State_finds_15M_for_dialysis.
The Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See, e.g., Tricia A. Bozek, Comment, Immigrants, Health Care, and the Constitution: Medicaid
Cuts in Maryland Suggest that Legal Immigrants Do Not Deserve the Equal Protection of the Law,
36 U. BALT. L. REV. 77, 80 (2006) (concluding that “the courts in Maryland should apply a
strict scrutiny test to the . . . cuts in Medicaid funding affecting legal immigrants and declare those cuts unconstitutional.”); Liza Cristol-Deman & Richard Edwards, Closing the
Door on the Immigrant Poor, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 141 (1998) (discussing the changes in
benefits to immigrants caused by the PRWORA and the constitutional issues it raised);
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV.
787, 795 (2008) (arguing that a “federalism lens is a particularly fine tool for determining
the proper allocation of immigration authority among levels of government and is vastly
superior to the blunt tool of structural preemption”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997) (arguing that “the Personal
Responsibility Act presages new possibilities for state-level modulation in immigrant policy that will more efficiently represent wide state-to-state variations in voter preferences
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tion that the Supreme Court’s alienage equal protection jurisprudence does not clearly resolve: What standard of review must a court
apply to the exclusion of aliens from solely state-funded and joint10
funded benefit programs when Congress has delegated (or “de11
volved” ) some of its policymaking authority to the states? Absent
clear precedents, some courts have treated these alien exclusions as a
federal immigration policy that warrants a deferential, rational basis
12
review standard; other courts have viewed the exclusions as state13
level alienage classifications that must withstand strict scrutiny.
Drawing on recent cases, I argue that the categorical approach
that courts have taken—labeling the alienage classification as either
“state” or “federal” and applying the attendant standard of review—
ignores the nuances of alien status under federal law and how that
status dictates the underlying policy options available to states for
their provisions of public benefits. The argument proceeds in four
parts. Part I will explain the equal protection doctrinal framework
applied to aliens and how the alien-eligibility scheme enacted as part
of the 1996 federal welfare reform challenges that framework. Part II
will review the limited relevant case law in three groups: (1) exclusion of aliens from joint-funded benefit programs by reason of a uniform federal rule; (2) exclusion of aliens from joint-funded benefit
programs for which federal law permits eligibility; and (3) exclusion
of aliens from solely state-funded benefit programs. Part III will then
propose guideposts for courts to use when reviewing similar alienagebased equal protection challenges.

10
11

12

13

and that may ultimately benefit aliens as a group”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493, 493 (2001) (concluding that “any devolution of authority over immigration to the
states, such as that contained in the 1996 welfare reforms, may not receive the judicial
deference traditionally granted to federal immigration law”); Note, The Constitutionality of
Immigration Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247 (2005) (discussing various court decisions
on the constitutionality of the PRWORA).
I use this term to refer to a benefit program supported by both state and federal funds.
Much of the scholarship in this area refers to Congress’s “devolving” its power to set immigration policy. E.g., Roger C. Hartley, Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: A Separation of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 93 (2007) (“For
roughly a decade, federal legislation has devolved to the states some of Congress’s authority to adopt immigration policies that discriminate against permanent resident aliens.”);
Wishnie, supra note 9, at 496 (describing the relevant federal statute as “an attempt by
Congress to devolve some of the exclusively federal immigration power to the states”).
See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying rational basis review); Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 1999 SD 108, ¶ 18, 598 N.W.2d 887, 892 (S.D.
1999) (same).
See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1243 (Md. 2006) (applying strict-scrutiny review); Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (same).
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Finally, Part IV will use those guideposts to identify alienage-based
equal protection violations that have not been challenged in the cases
reviewed. Those cases focused on state conduct that clearly and directly affected aliens—e.g., statutes or administrative regulations that
ended eligibility for public benefits that aliens previously enjoyed.
But proper equal protection review requires an assessment of the underlying policy choices that states make when structuring their provisions of public benefits. I identify three such state-level policy choices
that effect alienage classifications and should thus be invalidated under strict scrutiny review. Because these policy choices are far more
common among the states than the types of state actions challenged
in cases to date, the argument advanced here could significantly expand the scope of alienage equal protection litigation. I also recommend how states can alter their public-benefit schemes to remedy the
identified constitutional defects.
I. PRUDENTIAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. The Graham and Mathews Decisions
Two Supreme Court decisions govern the landscape of challenges
to government classifications based on alienage. In the first, Graham
14
v. Richardson, the Court held that laws in Pennsylvania and Arizona
that restricted welfare benefits to U.S. citizens or imposed durational
residency requirements on aliens violated the Equal Protection
15
Clause. The challenged Arizona law conditioned a legally residing
alien’s eligibility for federally supported welfare benefits on residing
16
in the United States for fifteen years. Pennsylvania’s law, in contrast,
17
extended a solely state-funded welfare benefit to citizens only. The
Court applied strict scrutiny review to both laws because classifica-

14
15

16

17

403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Id. at 376. The Court also noted that these state laws were unconstitutional because they
impermissibly encroached on exclusive federal power over immigration. Id. at 379–80.
While Justice Harlan joined the opinion only with respect to this federalism-based rationale, the rest of the Court joined Justice Blackmun’s entire opinion.
Id. at 367. Arizona argued that the Social Security Act authorized states to impose such
requirements, id. at 380–81, but the Court applied the avoidance canon of statutory interpretation because the constitutionality of such an authorization would be suspect. Id.
at 382–83. This is the constitutional question confronting state and lower federal courts
today and which this Article addresses in the context of state-funded and joint-funded
benefit programs.
Id. at 368.
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tions based on alienage are inherently suspect. Both states argued
that the desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its citizens jus19
tified the laws, but the Court found this state interest inadequate to
20
meet strict scrutiny.
21
Five years later, the Court held in Mathews v. Diaz that Congress
may impose a five-year durational residency requirement before an
alien is eligible for enrollment in Medicare, a federal health insurance program for the elderly. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
John Paul Stevens explained that the Constitution gives Congress
broad powers over naturalization and immigration, allowing Congress to regulate aliens in a manner that it could not regulate citi22
zens. These powers, for which there is no state counterpart, justified
Congress’s line-drawing between citizens and aliens, and within the
23
class of aliens, for the provision of welfare benefits. The two requirements Congress set for alien eligibility in Medicare—
18

19

20

21
22
23

An alien class is a quintessential “discreet and insular minority,” id. at 372 (citing United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), and is particularly vulnerable to political process failures because aliens cannot
vote. See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1095 (“Recognizing, however, that ‘discrete and insular
minorities’ can be shut out of the political process, the [Supreme] Court has applied a
more searching inquiry to statutes that draw classifications aimed at these
groups.”)(citation omitted); see also Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1365, 1371 (2007) (“Those who drafted the Equal Protection Clause knew all too
well that discrimination against noncitizens required constitutional prohibition.”); Press
Release, Health Law Advocates, Healthcare Advocacy Group Health Law Advocates Challenges Law Excluding Legal Immigrants From Healthcare (Feb. 25, 2010) (noting that
legal immigrants “can’t vote—so in a budget crisis, they’re the first ones to suffer” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The risk of such process failures requires more thorough
judicial review of laws that target aliens as a class. See generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
Subsequent cases have carved out a “political-function exception” by which a state may
justify an alienage classification, such as barring aliens from becoming state police troopers, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978), and public school teachers, Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979). For a limitation on this exception, see Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227–28 (1984) (refusing to apply the political-function exception
to notaries).
Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. The Court later held that a state alienage classification inconsistent with federal law could be struck down as a matter of federal preemption. Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982). For an argument advancing the equal protection rationale, see Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the
Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1985). For a critique of applying equal
protection doctrine to state laws regarding aliens that instead advances a preemption
view, see David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?,
31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979).
426 U.S. 67 (1976).
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 80 (“The real question . . . is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens
is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens . . . is permissible.” (emphasis in original)).
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permanent-residence status and five years of continuous residency—
24
were not wholly irrational and thus met the Court’s highly deferen25
tial standard of review.
The Court noted that Graham did not control the question presented in Mathews: Even though the classification was essentially the
26
same, the source of the classification was not. That Congress, not
the states, imposed the classification was significant because “the
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal
27
power over immigration and naturalization.” The Court held that
the exercise of Congress’s expansive immigration power required ju28
dicial deference. Thus, Mathews left Graham intact but clarified that
its rule of strict scrutiny review did not apply to federal alienage clas29
sifications.
Together, Graham and Mathews establish the twin principles that
the federal government’s power over immigration and naturalization
24
25

26
27
28

29

Id. at 83.
Id. at 82. Some scholars contend that Mathews was wrongly decided—i.e., that equal protection principles require strict scrutiny of any level of government making alienage classifications. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 314 (noting that rationales for treating aliens as a suspect class, such as the “immutable characteristic” and “political powerlessness” theories, apply equally as to state and federal government); see generally Linda S.
Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047
(1994) (discussing the distinction in the current case law between the scrutiny applied to
individuals considered “inside” the political community and those considered “outside”
of it); Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution’s Promise: An Argument for Greater Judicial Scrutiny of Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319 (2001) (asserting that aliens are protected by the same laws as citizens, and that the Supreme Court should set out
to more strictly review laws that classify based on alienage, even if those laws are enacted
under the federal power to control immigration and naturalization); see also Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien,” 46 WASHBURN L.J. 263, 296–306 (2007)
(arguing that Mathews should be challenged and strict scrutiny should apply to federal alienage classifications because “the ‘alien’ construction functions as a proxy for race or nationality”); Note, The Constitutionality of Immigration Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247,
2270 n.171 (2005) (noting that “[a] reexamination of Mathews has wide support in the legal academy” and citing examples). This Article, however, works within the current Graham/Mathews framework so that it can be of practical use to lower courts and practitioners.
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84–85.
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 81–82, 81 n.17. See also Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien
Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 602–03 (1994) (noting
the “great deference accorded to Congress on issues of immigration and naturalization”
illustrated by the Mathews decision).
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84–85 (noting that while Graham’s holding that states may not regulate aliens’ welfare benefits is upheld, this does not mean the federal government is prohibited from such regulation).
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allows it wide discretion to set the conditions for an alien’s entry and
residence in the United States, but that states do not have a compa30
rable power. Rather, the states have “little, if any, basis” for prefer31
ential treatment of citizens over aliens.
This two-tiered doctrinal structure from Graham and Mathews—
strict scrutiny for state welfare laws restricting alien eligibility and rational basis review for their federal counterparts—functions when the
source of the classification and the funding for the benefit are clear
and, in the case of federal classifications, aligned. State classifications
are constitutionally infirm, whether the benefit is solely state-funded
(an equal protection violation), or partially federal-funded (an equal
32
protection violation and a Supremacy Clause violation).
Federal
classifications are constitutionally permissible for a federal-funded
33
benefit.
This doctrinal framework does not function adequately, however,
if the system of providing public benefits to aliens varies from the relatively straightforward scheme of states determining eligibility for
state-funded benefits and the federal government determining eligibility for federal-funded benefits. But Congress nonetheless departed
from that scheme in 1996 with the passage of the Personal Responsi34
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
Among its many reforms to the welfare system, PRWORA redistributed the decision-making authority over alien eligibility for public benefits between the federal government and state governments. After
PRWORA became law, state and federal court decisions reviewing al35
ien eligibility for welfare benefits diverged, demonstrating a lack of
consensus regarding how the Graham/Mathews framework should apply when the relevant policymaking is in some parts federal and other
parts state-by-state.
30
31
32
33

34

35

See id. (describing and distinguishing the Graham holding).
Id. at 85.
See supra note 20.
At issue in Mathews was the Medicare Part B medical-insurance program, financed in
equal parts by the federal government and monthly premiums by the enrollees. Mathews,
426 U.S. at 70, n.1.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). Commonly referred to as the Welfare Reform
Act, the provisions relevant to alien eligibility for public benefits are codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1641.
Compare Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970 (Mass.
2012) (holding that the elimination of a state-funded benefit for certain aliens violated
the Equal Protection Clause), and Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001) (same),
with Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the elimination of
such a state-funded benefit did not violate the Equal Protection Clause) and Hong Pham
v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011) (same).
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B. Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits under PRWORA
Before PRWORA, legally residing aliens had access to most public
36
benefits on the same terms as citizens. This was true with regard to
legal permanent residents (holders of “green cards”) as well as any
other alien who was “permanently residing under color of law”
37
(“PRUCOL”).
But PRWORA dramatically changed the eligibility
38
for, and administration of, public benefits for these aliens.
Both the text of the Act and its financial implications show that
39
PRWORA targeted legal aliens. It proclaims a national policy that
aliens not depend on public resources and that public benefits not
40
attract immigrants to the United States. Congress also noted in the
Act that then-current eligibility rules had failed to ensure that aliens
41
Moreover, the cost savings
not burden public-benefit programs.
from PRWORA attributable to restricting alien eligibility were vastly
disproportional to the share of total welfare spending that aliens
42
comprised.
36
37

38
39
40

41
42

See WENDY ZIMMERMANN & KAREN C. TUMLIN, THE URBAN INST., PATCHWORK POLICIES:
STATE ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS UNDER WELFARE REFORM 14-18 (May 1999).
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453,
1458 (1995). PRUCOL originated as a category in a 1972 amendment to the Social Security Act. See Ryan Knutson, Deprivation of Care: Are Federal Laws Restricting the Provision of
Medical Care to Immigrants Working as Planned?, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 401, 414 (2008)
(citing Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1614, 86 Stat. 1329, 1471 (defining, “[f]or purposes of this title, the term ‘aged, blind, or disabled individuals” as, amongst others, “an alien lawfully
residing in the United States under color of law”)). The term generally refers to asylees,
persons paroled into the United States, “and miscellaneous others who remain in the
United States with the knowledge and permission of the [federal government] and whom
the [federal government] does not intend to remove.” Legomsky, supra at 1459. Plaintiffs in Korab and Aliessa, among other cases, include PRUCOLs. See Korab v. McManaman, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1029–30 (describing one set of plaintiffs as residents of countries with Compacts of Free Association (“COFA”) with the United States) and SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAMS OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM: GN 00303.400
AUTHORIZED ALIEN STATUS, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200303400
(last visited March 17, 2014) (describing COFA residents as “permanent nonimmigrants”
who fall under the PRUCOL eligibility rules); Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1088 (describing
plaintiff aliens as falling into two groups, lawfully admitted permanent residents and
PRUCOLs).
ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 15.
See Wishnie, supra note 9, at 511 (“Immigrants, especially legal immigrants, were plainly a
chief congressional target.”).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2) (2012) (“It continues to be the immigration policy of the United
States that . . . the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States.”).
See id. § 1601(4) (2012) (“Current eligibility rules . . . have proved wholly incapable of
assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.”).
The National Conference of State Legislatures estimated that alien benefit cuts accounted for $24 billion of PRWORA’s $53 billion in savings. But $12 billion of those savings
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But PRWORA’s most significant change with respect to aliens and
public benefits was the delegation to the states of the authority to re43
strict or expand alien eligibility. This shift of authority from the
44
federal government to the states “threw a wrench” into the Graham/Mathews framework. To understand the significance of this shift
and the divergent court decisions it has produced, one must first understand PRWORA’s alien-eligibility scheme. That scheme in part
dictates what discretion, if any, a state may exercise in determining
the alien’s eligibility for public benefits.
Congress built PRWORA’s alien-eligibility scheme on defining two
primary types of benefits and three categories of aliens. PRWORA
distinguishes, according to funding source and administering agency,
45
a “federal public benefit,” governed by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611–1613, and a
46
“state or local public benefit,” governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1621. A benefit funded by both state and federal funds is considered a federal pub47
lic benefit. Federal public benefits are further subdivided into two

43
44
45

46

47

were retracted when Congress restored Supplemental Security Income benefits to qualified aliens residing in the United States before 1996 who were already receiving SSI payments. ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, AMERICA’S NEWCOMERS:
MENDING THE SAFETY NET FOR IMMIGRANTS 1 (1998). See also Wishnie, supra note 9, at
511–12 (noting that approximately forty-four percent of PRWORA’s overall federal savings came from denying benefits to legal immigrants, who make up “a far lower percentage of welfare recipients”).
See Spiro, supra note 9, at 1627 (describing PRWORA as “the Great Devolution,” which
“eschew[ed] a century of judicially protected exclusive federal authority”).
Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1606 (2008).
8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(B) defines this term, in relevant part, as “any retirement, welfare,
health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance,
unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are
provided . . . by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United
States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) follows the same definition structure as § 1611(c), except substituting
“agency of a state or local government” for “agency of the United States” and “funds of a
state or local government” for “funds of the United States.” For ease of reading, I refer to
these benefits as “state public benefits” or, to contrast joint-funded benefit programs, as
“solely state-funded benefit programs.”
8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(3) provides that a state public benefit “does not include any Federal
public benefit under section 1611(c) of this title,” indicating that public benefits with
federal and state funding sources are “federal public benefits” under PRWORA. This interpretation of the two sections appeared in regulations proposed, but not adopted, by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice. See Verification of Eligibility for Public Benefits, 63 Fed. Reg. 41662-01, (proposed Aug. 4, 1998)
(proposing that various entities providing “Federal public benefits” verify the eligibility of
its alien recipients); Interim Guidance on Verification of Citizenship, Qualified Alien Status and Eligibility Under Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 62 Fed. Reg. 61344 (proposed Nov. 17, 1997) (same). A regulation on “affidavits of support on behalf of immigrants” adopts a similar interpretation of
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groups: (1) “specified Federal programs,” defined as food stamps
48
and supplemental security income (SSI) ; and (2) “designated Federal programs,” defined as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
49
(TANF), social services block grants (SSBG), and Medicaid.
“Specified federal programs” are wholly federally funded, while
“designated federal programs” are jointly funded. Medicaid programs, which provide health benefits to certain low-income populations, are state-run and state-funded but receive substantial federal
50
reimbursements. TANF “replaced the former federal welfare pro51
gram popularly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children”
and, along with SSBG, provides federal block grants to assist statefunded efforts to provide needy families assistance while moving
52
them towards self-sufficiency. Nearly all of the alien equal protection litigation to date has challenged exclusions from Medicaid,
TANF, and solely state-funded programs that provide benefits com53
parable to Medicaid and TANF. This Article concentrates on those
54
programs.
PRWORA classifies aliens into three categories: (1) “qualified aliens”; (2) “nonimmigrants”; and (3) aliens who are neither qualified
aliens nor nonimmigrants (I will call this group “undocumented al55
56
iens”). A qualified alien is a legal permanent resident. A nonim-

48
49
50
51
52

53

54

55

the PRWORA definitions, noting that a state public benefit is “any public benefit for
which no Federal funds are provided.” 8 C.F.R. § 213a.1 (2000) (defining “means-tested
public benefit”).
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3) (2012).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (making appropriations for “making payments to States which have
submitted . . . State plans for medical assistance”).
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 182 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998).
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf
(describing the nature and goals of the TANF program).
A notable exception is Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the
elimination of Washington’s Food Assistance Program for Legal Immigrants, a solely
state-funded food benefit). The reason for this focus on Medicaid and TANF programs is
that, as explained, infra note 63, states do not have discretion to determine alien eligibility for food stamps or SSI.
I do not focus on exclusion of aliens from specified federal programs because PRWORA
applies a uniform federal rule to alien eligibility for wholly federally funded benefits.
These benefits thus fall neatly under the Mathews rule of rational basis review. See cases
cited, infra note 89.
Courts have misinterpreted PRWORA as creating only two categories—qualified aliens
and non-qualified aliens—which lumps together lawfully residing nonimmigrants, such as
the Korab plaintiffs, with unlawfully present aliens. See, e.g., Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 406 n.2 (Mass. 2002) (“A ‘qualified alien’ is one who has
some legal residency status in the United States. An alien who is not ‘qualified’ does not.”
(citation omitted)); Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1090–91 (N.Y. 2001) (“Under ti-
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migrant is an alien meeting the definition of that term provided in
57
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Undocumented aliens, the
third category of aliens under PRWORA, lack a recognized legal status by the federal government and thus do not meet the definition of
58
either qualified aliens or nonimmigrants. Generally, qualified aliens
have greater potential eligibility for federal and state public benefits
than nonimmigrants, and nonimmigrants have greater potential eligibility than undocumented aliens.
The qualified-alien category is further subdivided based on when
the alien entered the United States and how long he or she has resided with qualified-alien status. Aliens legally entering on or before
August 22, 1996 (“pre-enactment aliens”) and aliens residing in the
United States with qualified-alien status for at least five years (what I
59
will call “the five-year bar”) have greater potential eligibility for public benefits than qualified aliens not meeting either of those conditions.
60
Chart 1, summarizes how PRWORA matches these categories of
aliens and benefits into an eligibility scheme. PRWORA gives individual states the authority to determine a qualified alien’s eligibility
61
62
for state public benefits, benefit programs using federal TANF

56

57

58

59
60
61
62

tle IV, aliens are divided into two categories: qualified aliens and non-qualified aliens.”
(citation omitted)). Some PRWORA provisions apply to nonimmigrant and nonqualified aliens equally, but others, like eligibility for state and local public benefits, do
not. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012) (providing that “an alien who is not a qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit”) with 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (providing that “aliens who are not qualified aliens or nonimmigrants [are] ineligible for State
and local public benefits). Thus, PRWORA’s distinction between these three categories
of aliens is important.
8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2012) (definition of “qualified alien”). Qualified aliens also include
specific aliens that are not legal permanent residents, including Cuban and Haitian entrants, asylees, refugees, and certain victims of spousal or parental battery. Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)). This definition covers a wide
range aliens who are present in the United States under color of law, generally on a temporary basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2) (listing various
classifications of nonimmigrants).
See supra notes 55, 57. PRWORA bars aliens who are neither qualified aliens nor nonimmigrants from receiving state public benefits unless the state “affirmatively provides for
such eligibility” through a statute enacted after August 22, 1996. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)
(2012). This same bar does not apply to nonimmigrants.
8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2012).
See infra Chart 1.
8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012) (“[A] State is authorized to determine the eligibility for any State
public benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien . . . .”).
States have the option of administering TANF funds as a separate federal benefit, or
combining it with state funds into a joint-funded benefit program. See 45 C.F.R. § 263.2
(2005) (outlining which state expenditures count towards meeting a State’s “Maintenance of Effort” expenditure requirements).
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63

funds, and Medicaid. But Congress reserved two exceptions to this
broad grant of authority to states. First, the five-year bar on eligibility
for TANF and Medicaid is mandatory; a state cannot enroll a qualified alien in either program until five years after the alien attains
qualified-alien status. Second, a qualified alien who has worked forty
qualifying quarters as defined in the Social Security Act or is a veteran
64
65
or on active duty in the armed forces must be eligible for state and
66
federal public benefits.
In contrast, state discretion over nonimmigrant eligibility is narrower. A state can determine whether a nonimmigrant receives state
public benefits, but not federal public benefits. Nonimmigrants are,
with few exceptions, mandatorily ineligible for federal public bene67
fits.
Undocumented aliens are presumptively ineligible for state public
benefits. These aliens may receive such benefits only if a state “affirmatively provides for such eligibility” through a state statute enact68
ed after PRWORA’s enactment. They are categorically barred from
federal public benefits.
Courts must give careful attention to the particular legal status of
aliens bringing equal protection challenges for two reasons. First, an
alien’s legal status under PRWORA dictates, in part, the options
available to states for providing public benefits. As I will explain further, those state options in turn bear on the appropriate standard of
equal protection review to apply.
Second, legal status has constitutional significance independent of
PRWORA as well. The Supreme Court noted in Plyler v. Doe that
states have greater leeway to draw classifications that disfavor individuals who entered the United States illegally and thus are not a suspect

63

64
65
66
67
68

8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1),(3) (2012) (defining Medicaid as a “designated Federal program”
and stating that “a State is authorized to determine the eligibility of an alien who is a
qualified alien . . . for any designated Federal program”). States may not set eligibility for
the federal-funded SSI or food stamp programs. These two programs are “specified Federal programs” under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3), and not “designated Federal programs” under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3), which means that states do not have authority to determine a
qualified alien’s eligibility for either program. Id. § 1612(b)(1). PRWORA generally bars
aliens from receiving these two types of federally funded benefits. Id. § 1612(a)(1) (noting that qualified aliens are ineligible for specified Federal programs except for those
outlined by statute); 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012) (“[A]n alien who is not a qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit . . . .”).
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I), (a)(2)(C)(i)–(ii) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1622(b)(2)–(3) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2012).

May 2014]

ALIENATING ALIENS

1429

69

class. Such state-drawn classifications are not subject to strict scruti70
ny. Thus, the same discriminatory state action that would receive
strict scrutiny if taken against qualified aliens and nonimmigrants
would receive more deferential review if taken against undocumented aliens. This distinction explains why the cases reviewed in this Article were brought by both qualified aliens and nonimmigrants but
not by undocumented aliens. Likewise, the argument I develop for
proper equal protection review applies only to the two PRWORA categories of aliens that have a documented legal status (qualified aliens
and nonimmigrants).
II. PRWORA-ERA CASES
Congress’s devolving to the states the authority to determine alien
eligibility for public benefits—an example of what scholars have
joined Professor Hiroshi Motomura in calling “immigration federal71
72
ism” —created an uneven “patchwork” of state policies, where similarly situated aliens can receive vastly different benefits solely depending on their state of residence. Under PRWORA, some states provide
little or no state-funded benefits to qualified aliens and nonimmi73
grants, while other states provide them substantial benefits.
For
many aliens, states determine eligibility for state-funded benefits and
benefits heavily subsidized by the federal government, like TANF and
74
Medicaid. Indeed, the same qualified alien could, for instance, ac69

70

71

72
73

74

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“[U]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a
suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 226. See also Maria Pabón López & Diomedes J. Tsitouras, From the Border to the
Schoolhouse Gate: Alternative Arguments for Extending Primary Education to Undocumented Alien
Children, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 1260 (2008) (describing the standard of review applied in Plyler as “the rational basis standard, albeit ‘with a bite.’” (citation omitted)).
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (1999). However, Motomura supports the view that immigration power is exclusively federal. See Spiro, supra note 9, at 1627 n.* (crediting Hiroshi Motomura with coining the phrase); see, e.g., Huntington, supra note 9; Peter H.
Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 63 (2007); Spiro, supra note 9; Wishnie, supra note 9, at 508.
I borrow this term from ZIMMERMAN & TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 14–18.
ZIMMERMAN & TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 49. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANTS’ ELIGIBILITY FOR SNAP, TANF, MEDICAID, AND CHIP 19
(2012), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/11/ImmigrantAccess/Eligibility/ib.shtml
(comparing alien eligibility for state-funded benefits among the states).
For example, states can deny such joint-funded benefits to aliens who arrived in the United States prior to PRWORA’s enactment, to qualified aliens even after the mandatory fiveyear bar, and to nonimmigrants. See ZIMMERMAN AND TUMLIN, supra note 36, at 15 (outlining where states have the option of determining eligibility).
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cess TANF benefits in Louisiana but not Mississippi, or Medicaid
76
benefits in Pennsylvania but not Ohio. Some states facing budget
difficulties have taken advantage of the discretion PRWORA affords
them, eliminating benefits for qualified aliens and nonimmigrants as
77
a viable cost-saving measure.
Alien challenges to this patchwork system of public benefits have
78
produced divergent decisions in state and federal courts. Courts
struggle to fit the alienage-based eligibility classifications within the
Graham/Mathews doctrinal structure because those classifications are
neither clearly state nor clearly federal. Unlike Arizona and Pennsyl79
vania’s pre-PRWORA laws reviewed in Graham, these eligibility classi80
fications are now made with congressional approval. Likewise, the
classifications are distinct from those drawn by the federal eligibility
requirement reviewed in Mathews. That requirement was a uniform,
nationwide rule and applied to Medicare, a solely federal-funded
81
benefit.
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, federal and
state courts have employed inadequate equal protection analyses to
82
reach inconsistent decisions. The following three categories of cases
will demonstrate how the current judicial methodology fails to meet
the twin foundations of Graham and Mathews: preventing states from
favoring their resident citizens over their resident aliens (Graham)
and allowing the federal government wide latitude in regulating the
terms and conditions of alien entrance and residency (Mathews).
75
76
77
78
79

80
81
82

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANTS’ ELIGIBILITY, supra
note 73, at 31.
Id. at 13–14, 16.
See supra note 6.
See supra note 35.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367–68 (1971) (describing the state laws ultimately
declared unconstitutional). See also id. at 382–83 (rejecting Arizona’s argument that federal law authorized its state statute).
8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012).
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1976).
This is not to say that Graham and Mathews are unable to resolve any challenge brought
against a PRWORA provision. Where Congress sets its own uniform eligibility rule for
federal-funded benefits (SSI and food stamps), it is operating well within the heartland of
Mathews and courts have correctly applied rational basis review in suits challenging this
rule. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999); City of Chi. v.
Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999); Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Minn.
1998); Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Following Mathews, these
courts have held that Congress’s near-plenary immigration power requires judicial deference in reviewing a federal determination of how federal funds will be distributed
amongst classes of aliens. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1346–47 (adopting a narrow
standard of review in light of the need for “flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions”).
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A. Exclusions from Joint-Funded Benefits by Uniform Rule
The first category of cases is challenges brought by qualified aliens
that have yet to meet the five-year residency threshold for Medicaid
83
and TANF eligibility (“QAs<5”). These challenges appear to be an
easy case for the straightforward application of deferential review under Mathews. Consistent with the Medicare eligibility rule at issue in
Mathews, PRWORA’s five-year bar is a federal rule that states do not
84
have discretion to alter. However, PRWORA’s rule applies to benefits that, unlike Medicare, are funded with both federal and state dollars. Thus, unlike the federal statute reviewed in Mathews, the federal
rule here restricts alien access to federal funds and the state funds
that a state chooses to put into a joint-funded benefit program.
By channeling state funds into a Medicaid program or commingling them with federal TANF funds, a state can block QAs<5 (and
other legally residing aliens) from accessing state funds but point to
PRWORA as the source of alien exclusion. This difference from
Mathews is significant because PRWORA’s rule allows states to dedicate substantial funds to the benefit of its citizen residents but not its
85
legal-alien residents, a result that directly conflicts with Graham. As
outlined below, courts have failed to recognize this difference from
Mathews or its import. Because courts focus on PRWORA as the
source of the alienage classification, rather than the underlying state
decision to dedicate its funds only to an alien-excluding benefit program, they have applied rational basis review to states’ removals of
QAs<5 from joint-funded benefit programs. In other words, courts
have focused on the states’ compliance with mandatory federal rules
for joint-funded benefit programs, but ignored the antecedent fact
that state funding of those programs is a state policy choice subject to
equal protection review. Decisions from two state high courts
demonstrate this proposition.
1. South Dakota’s Cid Decision
In Cid v. South Dakota Department of Social Services, two QAs<5 who
entered the United States in December 1996 challenged on equal
protection grounds South Dakota’s 1997 regulations implemented to
86
comply with PRWORA. Under the regulations, the plaintiffs were
83
84
85
86

8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012); see supra note 59.
8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 368 (1971) (striking down Pennsylvania’s law that
would restrict state-funded benefits to its citizen residents only).
Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887, 889 (S.D. 1999).
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no longer eligible for Medicaid, TANF, and food stamps. The South
Dakota Supreme Court applied rational basis review to the regulations because the state rules were consistent with federal law, which
88
bars QAs<5 from receiving joint-funded benefits. In applying rational basis review, the court relied on decisions from federal district
courts and courts of appeals that upheld PRWORA’s five-year bar ap89
plied to wholly federal-funded benefits. Neither the Cid court nor
any of its cited authority considered whether Mathews should apply to
90
joint-funded benefits the same way it applies to wholly federalfunded benefits.
Since these courts have not acknowledged the difference between
wholly federal-funded benefits and joint-funded benefits, they do not
offer a justification for why the Mathews standard of review should
apply to a state’s implementation of a federal rule restricting alien eligibility for state funds. The Cid decision is correct insofar as Mathews
recognizes federal power to limit alien access to federal benefits. The
problem with Cid is that its application of Mathews’s deferential standard of review to the denial of a joint-funded benefit allows South Dakota to do what Graham forbids—afford preferential treatment to its
resident citizens over its resident aliens through its choice of how to
91
fund public benefits. Nothing in Mathews or Graham suggests that a
state’s commingling its funds with federal funds shields from strict
scrutiny the state’s choice to commit such funds to the benefit of citizens and not aliens. Even though PRWORA’s five-year bar sets a uniform rule for alien eligibility in joint-funded benefit programs, states

87
88
89

90

91

Id.
Id. at 892.
The court cited Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Minn. 1998) (upholding a federal law denying food stamp benefits to certain groups of documented noncitizens under
the rational basis test), and Rodriguez v. Unites States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999)
(upholding federal laws denying food stamps and SSI to documented aliens based on rational basis). Also cited was Sinelnikov v. Shalala, No. 97C 4884, 1998 WL 164889 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 31, 1998), sub nom City of Chi. v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999), which did
concern Medicaid and TANF, but adopted the reasoning of Kiev, Rodriguez, and another
SSI case, Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Sinelkinov, 1998 WL
164889 at *11.
Although technically joint-funded, the federal food stamp program (SNAP) has only
nominal state financial participation, see Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“The federal government pays for the other fifty percent of administrative
costs, as well as the entire cost of the actual food benefits.” (citations omitted)), and is
functionally a federal benefit.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 368, 368 (1970) (describing the Pennsylvania statute
that violated equal protection as regarding “that portion of a general assistance program
that is not federally supported” and that was limited to “needy persons who are citizens of
the United States”).
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still exercise discretion in funding the benefit programs in the first
instance.
2. Massachusetts’ Doe Decision
92

Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance provides a similar, but
more complicated, example of a court applying Mathews-style deference where equal protection principles require a more searching review. The plaintiffs in Doe were QAs<5 and also had resided in Massa93
chusetts for less than six months. They challenged a state statute
that, pursuant to the five-year bar, made plaintiffs ineligible for the
state’s “transitional aid to families with dependent children (TAFDC)
94
program.”
The TAFDC program combined federal TANF funds
with state funds to support a cash-assistance benefit for its low-income
95
residents. At the same time, Massachusetts created a solely statefunded supplement to TAFDC that provided comparable benefits to
QAs<5 who would no longer be eligible for TAFDC because of the
96
five-year bar. The state imposed a six-month Massachusetts residen97
cy requirement for enrollment in the supplemental program.
Consistent with Cid, the Doe court found that Graham’s strictscrutiny rule did not apply to the plaintiffs’ challenge to their TAFDC
ineligibility because the state was merely adopting a mandatory, uniform federal rule, passed pursuant to Congress’s immigration pow98
ers. Although Graham provides the “general rule” for “State laws
that discriminate against legal immigrants,” the court found that
“[t]his general rule does not apply . . . to State laws that merely adopt
uniform Federal guidelines regarding the eligibility of aliens for ben99
efits.”
But the Doe plaintiffs, unlike the Cid plaintiffs, also challenged their exclusion from a solely state-funded benefit program.
The court held that rational basis review also was appropriate for the
92
93
94
95

96
97
98
99

773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 407.
Id; See also MASS. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Cash Assistance, available at
http://www.mass.gov/dta/assistance (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (describing TAFDC as cash
assistance to families with children and pregnant women who have little income or assets). Massachusetts’s commingling of federal TANF funds with state funds was optional.
States have wide latitude in how they spend the TANF funds, which they receive as block
grants from the federal government. See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text.
Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 407.
Id.
Id. at 409 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82–83 (1976) and Sudomir v. McMahon,
767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 409.
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state supplemental program’s eligibility requirements because the
100
state was under no obligation to provide this benefit, which meant
that the classification used was not alienage, but rather “Massachu101
setts residency.”
3. Massachusetts’s Finch Decision
Nine years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts revisited the issue of the appropriate standard of review to apply to the
102
The
exclusion of aliens from a joint-funded benefit program.
plaintiffs in the class action Finch v. Commonwealth Health Insurance
103
Connector Authority challenged a Massachusetts statute that eliminated their eligibility for Commonwealth Care, “a premium assistance
program in which enrollees pay a portion of their health insurance
premium based on a sliding scale with the remainder paid by the de104
105
fendant [Connector].” “Both State and Federal funds support the
provision of premium assistance payments on behalf of Common106
wealth Care enrollees.”
Commonwealth Care is a Medicaid
107
“demonstration project” that operates much like a regular Medicaid
100
101

102

103

104
105

106
107

Id. at 411.
Id. at 414. The court noted that the state was not discriminating between citizens and
aliens, but among a sub-class of aliens on the basis of bona fide Massachusetts residency.
Id.
See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass.
2011) (“[S]hould a State classification based on alienage be subjected to a ‘rational basis’
standard of review . . . ?”).
The plaintiffs asserted equal protection claims under both the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. After the state removed the case to federal court, the plaintiffs
dismissed the federal constitutional claim to get the case back into state court. Id. at
1268. However, “[i]n matters concerning aliens, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
has been interpreted to provide a right to the equal protection of the laws, coextensive
with the Federal right.” Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 408.
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1265.
The federal contribution to the program is approximately fifty percent of total expenditures, but was even higher (61.59 percent) in fiscal year 2010 due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Id. at 1267. As such, “at least two federally eligible residents (citizens or federally eligible aliens) could be enrolled in Commonwealth Care for
the same cost to the State as one member of the plaintiff class.” Id.
Id. at 1266.
42 U.S.C. § 1315. Congress has given the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services the power to waive certain requirements of state-administered welfare
programs, including Medicaid, so long as the Secretary determines the program is a
“demonstration project.” Id. § 1315(a). These projects are also referred to as “Section
1115 projects” or “Section 1115 waivers” because of the section of the Social Security Act
by which they are authorized. See also EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS21054, MEDICAID AND SCHIP SECTION 1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS
(2004) (explaining the unique provisions of Section 1115 of the Social Security Act,
which give broad authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to modify
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program but uses state funds to extend coverage to some classes of
108
federally ineligible individuals, including the plaintiff class of al109
iens. This coverage ended for the plaintiffs in 2009 when the state
adopted for Commonwealth Care the same alien-eligibility standards
110
PRWORA sets for federal-funded public-benefit programs.
Whereas Massachusetts’s high court held in Doe that the exclusion
of aliens from the joint-funded TAFDC program need only survive ra111
tional basis review, it concluded in Finch that the exclusion of aliens
from the joint-funded Commonwealth Care program must be re112
viewed under strict scrutiny. The court distinguished the two cases
by explaining that while Congress dictated the eligibility rule at issue
in Doe, in Finch the state voluntarily adopted an eligibility rule that
113
Congress neither required nor prohibited. Describing the termination of Commonwealth Care benefits for aliens, the court noted that
“[w]here the State is left with a range of options including discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, its selection amongst those
options must be reviewed under the standards applicable to the State
114
and not those applicable to Congress.”
4. Doe and Finch Are Not Distinguishable
Applying rational basis review to a state’s acquiescence to a uni115
form eligibility rule imposed by Congress, while holding to strict

108

109
110
111
112

113
114
115

SCHIP and Medicaid without congressional review). Although the Finch court explains
that “Commonwealth Care receives no reimbursement from the Federal government in
respect of expenditures made on behalf of federally ineligible individuals,” 946 N.E.2d at
1267, this may not be the case for all demonstration projects. See Spry v. Thompson, 487
F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that demonstration projects can expand coverage
to individuals who otherwise would not be eligible for Medicaid, with the state receiving
federal reimbursement as if those individuals were eligible).
For instance, the program extended coverage to individuals with a household income
level below 300 percent of the federal poverty level who are uninsured and “not eligible
for certain other State, Federal or employer-subsidized health insurance programs.”
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1266.
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1267. Commonwealth Care’s enabling statute provided eligibility for
not only “qualified aliens,” but also nonimmigrants. Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Mass. 2002)
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1277. The court later determined that the alien exclusion failed
strict scrutiny and thus violated equal protection. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins.
Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012).
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1275–76.
Id. at 1277.
See Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding under rational
basis review a California law that adhered to a uniform federal policy requiring states to
deny welfare assistance to certain aliens). The Sudomir court stressed that Congress had
enacted a uniform rule, such that the court did not have to address the indication from
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scrutiny a state’s decision to parrot that eligibility rule when Congress
does not so require, is a sound application of the Graham/Mathews
equal protection framework. But the Finch decision does not adequately articulate how a mandatory PRWORA provision was at work
in the TAFDC programs (Doe) but not in Commonwealth Care
(Finch). It notes that PRWORA permits alien eligibility for Commonwealth Care “so long as no Federal funds contribute to such
116
benefits.”
The court implicitly assumed that Commonwealth Care
met this condition because the state received federal funds based on
117
its expenditures for only federally eligible enrollees. This assumption is not only incorrect, but it also fails to distinguish Doe.
The court’s assumption was wrong because the federal and state
funds in a benefit program such as Commonwealth Care are fungible. When similarly situated aliens and citizens receive the same level
of benefits from a joint-funded program, they benefit equally from
the federal contribution, even if that contribution was calculated
based only on citizen enrollees. A simplified example will demonstrate the point: Suppose I am going to order pizza for a group of
students and you agree to reimburse me for fifty percent of what I
spend on pizza for students who wear glasses. If I divide the pizza
that our combined funds purchased equally among all of the students, then they all will benefit equally from your subsidy, regardless
of whether they wear glasses. The same principle applies to the fed118
eral subsidy of Commonwealth Care.
The court’s assumption also fails to distinguish Doe. Like the
Commonwealth Care benefits for federally ineligible enrollees in
Finch, the supplemental TAFDC program in Doe was solely statefunded. Under Finch, this similarity would mean that in both situations the state is acting of its own discretion, with no mandatory
PRWORA rule to apply. The state was in the same position with re-

116
117

118

Graham “that Shapiro may require the invalidation of congressional enactments permitting
states to adopt divergent laws regarding the eligibility of aliens for federally supported
welfare programs.” Id. at 1466–67.
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1276. The court cited 8 U.S.C. §§ 1622, 1624, & 1621(d), the
PRWORA provisions that authorize states to determine alien eligibility for state benefits.
Id. at 1267 (“[Massachusetts] assumed one hundred per cent of the cost of providing
Commonwealth Care subsidies to federally ineligible aliens.”). See id. at 1276 (explaining
how the state did not argue that it was in fact required to apply PRWORA’s alieneligibility rule to Commonwealth Care, presumably because the program did not follow
that rule in its first three years of operation).
See id. at 1285 (Gants, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining how the
use of “twice the State funds per capita” to provide the same health benefits to PRWORAbarred aliens that Medicaid-eligible citizens and aliens receive nullifies the effect of
PRWORA’s bar).
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spect to supplemental TAFDC as it was with the solely state-funded
portion of Commonwealth Care: It had a “range of options including
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, [and] its selection
amongst those options [had to] be reviewed under the standards ap119
plicable to the State.”
And in both cases, the state selected a discriminatory policy. In Finch, that policy was ending PRWORA-barred
aliens’ eligibility for Commonwealth Care; in Doe, it was applying a
six-month durational residency requirement on PRWORA-barred aliens’ receipt of supplemental TAFDC, a condition that did not apply
120
to citizens’ receipt of TAFDC.
Despite these similarities, the Doe
121
court applied rational basis review to the latter, while Finch held
122
that the former must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Surely the formality of denominating TAFDC and supplemental
TAFDC as separate programs, as compared to the state-funded and
joint-funded portions of Commonwealth Care falling under a single
program umbrella, cannot justify the different standards of review
123
applied, and neither Finch nor Doe suggest that it does. Contrary to
the Finch court’s reasoning, the same mandatory, uniform federal
rule (i.e., the five-year bar) applied to the benefit programs in both
cases. What the court failed to recognize is that the five-year bar did
not dictate the state’s policy choice of how to divide its welfare dollars
between joint-funded benefit programs (for which most aliens are ineligible) and solely state-funded benefit programs (for which
PRWORA allows all aliens to be eligible).
That state-level policy choice—combining state funds with federal
funds to create the TAFDC and Commonwealth Care programs—
exists entirely apart from and antecedent to the application of
PRWORA’s five-year bar. It thus cannot be shielded from judicial
scrutiny based on an argument that the state is complying with a federal mandate instead of exercising its own discretion. By choosing to
119
120

121
122
123

Id. at 1277.
Although the state chose to merely withhold the benefit during a qualified alien’s first six
months of Massachusetts residency, integral to the Doe court’s holding was the “undisputed” fact that “the Massachusetts Legislature was not required to establish the supplemental program.” Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Mass.
2002). Thus, the opinion’s logic dictates that a decision to eliminate the benefit entirely
need satisfy only rational basis review.
See id. at 414 (“Where, as here, [the] classification is Massachusetts residency, the proper
standard of review is rational basis.”).
See Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1277 (“Settled equal protection law therefore requires that [the
statute] be reviewed under strict scrutiny”).
See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a state
“could not evade strict scrutiny” simply through the formality of creating separate programs).
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combine state funds with federal funds, Massachusetts voluntarily
adopted the federal eligibility rule. The court should have recognized this state policy choice and applied strict scrutiny to the sixmonth durational residency requirement in Doe just as it did to the
termination of state-funded Commonwealth Care benefits in Finch.
5. The Finch Dissent: Requiring Equal Per-Capita Funding
In his dissent to the Finch majority’s conclusion that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard of review to apply to Massachusetts’s exclusion of the plaintiff aliens from Commonwealth Care, Justice
124
Ralph Gants, joined by Justice Robert Cordy, recognized that “substantially less” state expenditures per capita for the plaintiff aliens
than similarly situated Commonwealth Care enrollees would be a
125
state alienage classification subject to strict scrutiny.
This recognition is nearly correct, with an important caveat.
The dissenting justices “believe[d] that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to evaluate a State’s alienage classification only where the State’s per capita expenditures” are “substantial126
ly” unequal between similarly situated aliens and citizens.
This
statement articulates the general idea of what equal protection review
requires in these circumstances, but confuses the mechanics. A state
alienage classification is always subject to strict scrutiny, with some
127
exceptions not relevant here.
The per-capita expenditures on al124

125

126
127

That Justice Cordy joined in this dissent is notable because he was the author of Doe. Although consistent with Doe’s holding with regard to alien exclusion from TAFDC, this dissent undermines Doe’s validation of the durational residency requirement imposed on aliens receiving supplemental TAFDC. That latter holding depended on the preliminary
conclusion that the supplemental TAFDC program was optional and could be entirely
eliminated. See Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 411 (“It is undisputed that the Massachusetts Legislature was not required to establish the supplemental program.”). Justice Gants’s dissent in
Finch, however, suggests that, absent a compelling state interest, the state could not eliminate all state funding for resident aliens while continuing to fund a program benefitting
resident citizens. Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1281.
Finch, 946 N.E.2d at 1281 (Gants, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Gants dissented only because he concluded that the plaintiffs had not yet shown on the
limited record in the case that they were “suffering discrimination in the expenditure of
funds derived from State revenues.” Id. Neither Justice Gants nor the majority suggest
that the state provides plaintiffs any type of state-funded benefit that would be comparable to the state’s per capita expenditures in Commonwealth Care. Assuming there is no
such program, the basis for Justice Gants’s dissent is unfounded. He identified much of
the correct analysis, but reached the wrong result.
Id.
See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984) (“We have, however, developed a narrow exception to the rule that discrimination based on alienage triggers strict scrutiny.
This exception has been labeled the ‘political function’ exception and applies to laws that

May 2014]

ALIENATING ALIENS

1439

iens relative to citizens does not directly change the level of scrutiny
applied to a state alienage classification, as Justice Gants suggests, but
rather determines whether there is a state alienage classification in
the first place. If the state spends equal amounts on aliens and citizens alike, then it has not classified on the basis of alienage and the
equal protection inquiry never reaches the selection of a standard of
128
review.
With that said, Justice Gants’ dissent is the first judicial
opinion to correctly observe that a state’s financial participation in a
joint-funded benefit program implicates the equal protection rights
129
of individuals excluded from that program on the basis of alienage.
6. The Risk of Improper Application of Mathews’s Deferential Review
As a result of the Doe opinion’s equal protection analysis, Massachusetts could continue barring a number of legally residing aliens,
such as nonimmigrants, from receiving a state-funded benefit (supplemental TAFDC), even though state dollars were supporting a similar benefit for citizens (primary TAFDC), federally eligible aliens
(primary TAFDC), and some federally ineligible aliens (supplemental
TAFDC). The state could also place a six-month durational residency
requirement on the state benefit given to QAs<5 that it did not place
on individuals receiving primary TAFDC. But the improper application of Mathews to joint-funded benefits could have a much broader
impact. Because the Mathews analysis leads courts to the conclusion
that solely state-funded benefits for federally ineligible aliens are en-

128

129

exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic selfgovernment.”).
To be sure, an alienage classification would remain if citizens receive a higher level of
benefits because their benefit program has federal support. But that classification would
be federal and thus subject to rational basis review if challenged.
I note briefly that a potential distinction between Commonwealth Care and the TAFDC
programs, although not recognized by the Finch court, could support the different outcomes in Finch and Doe. Commonwealth Care was available for uninsured resident citizens with household incomes up to 300 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). Finch,
946 N.E.2d at 1266. The federal government, however, sets an income ceiling on the various categories of Medicaid-eligible populations for which it will provide funding. 42
C.F.R. § 435.1007 (2012). Because these ceilings do not approach 300 percent of the FPL
for most recipients and because Massachusetts receives federal reimbursement for expenditures on Commonwealth Care enrollees who are federally eligible, Finch, 946
N.E.2d at 1267, it appears that higher-income enrollees are supported solely by state
funds. If so, then the state was using its funds to benefit its higher-income resident citizens while, had the statute challenged in Finch stood, making no such expenditures to
benefit its resident aliens with similar or lower incomes. This reading provides an equalprotection basis for requiring the state to retain the plaintiff aliens in Commonwealth
Care. So long as the state uses its resources to extend the benefit to federally ineligible
citizens, it must do so for federally ineligible aliens as well.
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130

tirely optional, rather than constitutionally required to match state
contributions to a joint-funded benefit that excludes legally residing
aliens, these courts would allow states to deny such aliens public ben131
efits altogether.
The danger of cloaking eligibility requirements for joint-funded
benefits in Congress’s immigration powers is that it allows states to
funnel state dollars away from legal aliens to citizens, simply by mixing them with federal funds that are tied to alien-excluding provisions. The state then excludes the legal aliens from the joint-funded
benefit and argues to the courts that it is merely applying a federal
eligibility requirement, not adopting its own alienage classification.
132
Doe and Cid demonstrate that courts readily accept this argument,
protecting a state’s unequal distribution of resources under the
shield of deferential review, even though such deference is tied to the
133
exercise of exclusively federal immigration power. These decisions
contravene a maxim that the Supreme Court has repeated: Congress
134
may not authorize the states to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Accepting Doe’s and Cid’s application of Mathews appears more
reasonable when the joint-funded benefit is predominantly federally
135
sourced, or at least sourced at a one-to-one ratio. The greater the
proportion of federal dollars in the joint-funded benefit, the more
justifiable it seems to apply rational basis review to the alienexcluding provision because the benefit becomes more like the wholly federal-funded Medicare benefit that was the subject of Mathews.
But as PRWORA is written, and as courts have interpreted Mathews,
130

131

132
133

134

135

See Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Mass. 2002) (noting
that Massachusetts was “not required to establish [its] supplemental program); Soskin v.
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004) (describing the state Medicaid benefit
offered to, then withdrawn from, aliens as “optional Medicaid coverage”).
See, e.g., Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Me. 2013) (concluding in the course of
denying a preliminary injunction that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their equal
protection challenge to the elimination of a state-funded, alien-only health benefit program, which left plaintiffs without health benefits altogether).
Accord Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255–56 (explaining how states use separate programs for aliens
and citizens).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380 (1971) (holding that state laws that deny or
condition welfare benefits to noncitizens “equate with the assertion of a right . . . to deny
entrance and abode,” and “encroach upon exclusive federal power”); Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 84–85 (1976) (holding that the political branches of the federal government
regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens, not the states).
Graham, 403 U.S at 382; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). But see Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254 (criticizing this
maxim as nearly tautological).
Federal participation in Medicaid is calculated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2011).
These “federal medical assistance percentage[s]” (FMAP) are available at http://aspe.
hhs.gov/health/fmap.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
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this deferential review would still apply even if the federal portion of
the benefit is nominal. And yet a predominantly state-funded benefit
would appear more like the welfare benefits at issue in Graham for
which the Supreme Court held that states could not deny on the basis
of alienage.
Rather than blessing every joint-funded benefit with Mathews-style
deference or engage in arbitrary line-drawing with respect to what
percentage of federal dollars will trigger such deference, the Equal
Protection Clause requires courts to ensure that state welfare expenditures, whether administered separately or commingled with federal
funds, are not disparately apportioned on the basis of the recipient’s
alienage. Such a rule has the advantage of being judicially workable:
A state need only demonstrate to the court that it has spent the same
pro-rata funds on benefits for legally residing aliens as it has spent on
benefits for citizens in the joint-funded program. But more importantly, it adheres to the requirements of equal protection as interpreted by both Graham and Mathews.
B. Exclusions from Joint-Funded Benefits, But Not by Uniform Rule
1. Soskin
The second category of PRWORA-era cases are challenges to a
state’s exclusion of aliens from a joint-funded benefit for whom
PRWORA permits eligibility. This situation arises for qualified aliens
who have either met or are not subject to the five-year bar, such as
136
pre-enactment qualified aliens. PRWORA allows individual states to
determine whether such aliens will receive joint-funded benefits like
137
Medicaid and TANF.
138
In Soskin v. Reinertson, a class of legally residing aliens challenged
139
a 2003 Colorado law that rendered them ineligible for Medicaid, a
140
benefit program that the state had enrolled them in since 1997.
Unlike when states exclude aliens from a joint-funded benefit pro-

136
137

138
139

140

8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (2012) (providing that “a State is authorized to determine the
eligibility of an alien who is a qualified alien . . . for any designated Federal program (as
defined in paragraph (3))”). Such programs include TANF, social services block grants,
and Medicaid. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3)(A)-(C).
Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1244.
S.B. 03-176 § 1 (Colo. 2003) (repealing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26–4–301(1)(l)–(m), (2)–
(4)) (eliminating Medicaid coverage for qualified aliens present in the United States before August 22, 1996 and for qualified aliens who have been present for five years).
Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1246.
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gram pursuant to PRWORA’s mandatory five-year bar, here Colorado exercised discretion at two levels. First, Colorado chose to contribute state dollars to the joint-funded benefit, as described in the
preceding section. Second, it withdrew joint-funded benefits from
legal aliens for whom PRWORA allowed, and the state had previously
provided, eligibility. In contrast to the circumstances underpinning
Cid and Doe, Colorado was determining access to both state and fed142
eral funds, not just state funds.
The Mathews doctrine and its policy rationale do not apply here.
Whereas Mathews concerned a purely federal-funded benefit administered in every part of the country using the same federal-eligibility
143
requirement, PRWORA authorizes something quite different: a
state-by-state determination of alien eligibility for federal funds (the
federal contributions to Medicaid and TANF) and state funds (the
state contributions to those same programs). As explained above,
Graham prohibits state discrimination on the basis of alienage in the
144
provision of state-funded benefits.
But neither the Graham nor
Mathews holdings speak to a state’s ability to determine eligibility for
federal funds when Congress has by statutory design approved such
state discretion.
Although the holdings are silent on the issue, Graham sheds some
light on the proper standard of review in this situation. In dicta, the
Graham court acknowledged that Congress has broad power to control alien admission into the United States and the “terms and conditions of their naturalization,” but that Congress cannot exercise this
power to “authorize the individual states to violate the Equal Protec145
tion Clause.”
The Constitution textually constrains Congress’s immigration and naturalization power to establishing “an uniform Rule
146
of Naturalization.”
Although the Graham court did not reach the
141

142

143
144
145

146

8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012). Courts have appropriately upheld state’s complying with mandatory eligibility rules under PRWORA. See, e.g., Avila v. Biedess, 78 P.3d 280, 286 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003); see also Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding California’s compliance with a mandatory federal rule that precluded plaintiffs from
receiving AFDC benefits).
For a critique of Soskin, see Michael Shapland, Soskin v. Reinertson: An Analysis of the
Tenth Circuit’s Decision to Permit the State of Colorado to Withhold Medicaid Benefits from Aliens
Pursuant to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 2 SETON HALL
CIRCUIT REV. 339 (2005).
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69–70 (1976).
See supra Part I.A.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 641 (1969)). See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999) (“[W]e have consistently
held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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issue because it applied the constitutional-avoidance cannon to interpret a federal statute to preclude Arizona’s fifteen-year national residency requirement, it stated that a federal statute that would “permit
state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship
requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear
to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of uniformi147
ty.”
2. Soskin’s Misinterpretation of Graham and Mathews
148

The Tenth Circuit in Soskin, along with some state courts, has
misinterpreted Graham’s guidance. Graham stated that there is an
149
“explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity” and that it
“would appear” that divergent state eligibility requirements for aliens
150
receiving federal benefits would fail to meet this requirement. The
Soskin decision purports to recognize that the only open question, if
any, from Graham is “whether this appearance of unconstitutionality
151
is real.” The court’s analysis, however, wrongly suggests that there is
152
no uniformity requirement with which PRWORA must comport. In
other words, instead of answering whether PRWORA complies with a
constitutional uniformity requirement, the court instead concludes,
153
contrary to Graham, that there is no such requirement.

147

148

149

150
151
152

153

Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. Commentators have critiqued and defended the Court’s conclusion that Congress’s immigration power is exclusive and subject to a uniformity requirement. Compare Huntington, supra note 9, at 831 (arguing that states have some
measure of inherent power over immigration and alienage law and therefore alienage law
does not have to be uniform), with Wishnie, supra note 9, at 539 (arguing that each
source of immigration power—the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses, the
Foreign Commerce Clause, and the extra-constitutional concept of “inherent sovereignty”—is exclusively federal and cannot be devolved to the states).
See, e.g., Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887 (S.D. 1999) (affirming the decision to terminate certain welfare benefits to a legal resident alien, and holding that such
denial does not violate the United States or South Dakota Constitutions); Doe v. Comm’r
of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002) (similarly upholding Massachusetts’ TAFDC eligibility requirements).
Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. Subsequent cases have reiterated this uniformity requirement.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (“But if the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an
alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction.”).
See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382.
Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. But see id. at 1274 (Henry, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress could not decide on a
federal policy and instead adopted a “compromise” that promotes variation in policy
among the states and thus violates the uniformity requirement).
Id. at 1256 (“Of course, if Congressional authority for the PRWORA’s provisions regarding aliens does not rest on the Naturalization Clause, the limits on the exercise of power
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154

Although Graham provides that Congress’s power in the context
of regulating alien eligibility for welfare benefits comes from the
155
Naturalization Clause, the Soskin court reasoned that congressional
authority for such regulation “does not rest on the Naturalization
Clause” and that a constraint on power exercised through that
156
Clause—the uniformity requirement—does not necessarily apply.
The court’s justification for contradicting Graham is that Mathews did
157
not refer specifically to the Naturalization Clause. But Mathews did
note that Congress’s ability to make rules for aliens that it could not
make for citizens stems from “its broad power over naturalization and
158
immigration.”
Mathews does not cast any doubt on Graham’s au159
thority; in fact, the opinion explains its consistency with Graham.
Moreover, the Soskin decision ignores the Supreme Court’s later confirmation that the federal regulation of aliens reviewed deferentially
in Mathews was tied to congressional power to establish a uniform rule
of naturalization, as well as the power to regulate foreign commerce
160
and foreign affairs.
The issue of uniformity did not arise in Mathews because the Court
was considering a federal eligibility requirement that obviously ap161
plied uniformly throughout the country.
Since uniformity was a
non-issue, the Court had no reason to consider the uniformity constraint on congressional power exercised through the Naturalization

154
155
156

157
158
159

160

161

under that clause do not necessarily apply; the uniformity requirement is imposed only
on a ‘Rule of Naturalization.’”).
See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 (noting that Congress has power to “establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256; see also Unthaksinkun v. Porter, No. C11-0588JLR, 2011 WL
4502050, at *27 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28, 2011) (“The [Soskin] court concluded that a uniform rule was unnecessary to authorize the state’s action . . . .”). The Unthaksinkun decision goes on to note that “unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has not discarded
[the] requirement that courts apply rational basis review to suspect classifications only
where Congress has established a uniform rule.” Id. (citing Sudomir v. McMahon, 767
F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976).
Id. at 84-85. The Court subsequently described federal immigration and naturalization
power in terms consistent with Graham. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 225 (1982)
(noting the uniformity limitation to federal immigration and naturalization power and
citing the Naturalization Clause).
See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives from various sources, including the Federal Government’s power to establish
a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . , its power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nationals . . . , and its broad authority over foreign affairs.” (citations omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 70 n.1.
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Clause. The Soskin court placed too much significance on the fact
“that Mathews made no explicit mention of the Naturalization
162
Clause,” and not nearly enough significance on the fact that Graham—a decision that Mathews did not disturb—already established
that the Clause’s uniformity requirement applied when Congress
163
regulates alien eligibility for welfare benefits.
Recognizing the uniformity requirement is crucial to proper alienage equal protection review because it precludes the casting of
PRWORA’s grant of discretion to the states as a federal immigration
policy that requires judicial deference. State-by-state discretion is certainly Congress’s “rule” with regard to much of alien eligibility, but it
is not a uniform rule. And because a state exercise of discretion is not
a uniform federal rule, the deference that the Supreme Court has afforded such rules is unwarranted. For this reason, the basic principle
of Graham holds true—state policy that disfavors a class based on alienage must bear strict scrutiny.
C. Exclusions from Solely State-Funded Benefits
The final category of PRWORA-era cases is challenges to the exclusion of legally residing aliens from solely state-funded benefit pro164
grams. In this section, I will review Aliessa, a 2001 decision from the
New York Court of Appeals, as a counterpoint to Soskin’s flawed conclusion that the Naturalization Clause’s uniform-rule requirement
did not constrain the power that Congress exercised when enacting
PRWORA. I will also offer further support for Aliessa’s conclusion
that state discretion exercised pursuant to PRWORA does not warrant
Mathews-style deference.
Then I will turn to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 2012 deci165
sion in Pham v. Starkowski, which, unlike the Aliessa and Soskin decisions, avoids the question of uniformity (and substantive equal protection analysis altogether) by concluding that Connecticut did not
classify based on alienage when it terminated the plaintiff class’s solely state-funded health benefits. Finally, I will review Pham to critique

162

163

164
165

Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256. In his lengthy dissent, Judge Robert Harlan Henry argues that
PRWORA’s devolution of immigration and naturalization powers to the states violates the
uniformity requirement. Id. at 1274 (Henry, J. dissenting).
See Wishnie, supra note 9, at 493 (discussing how every source of federal immigration and
naturalization power precludes the devolution of that power, which would produce nonuniformity and contradict the notion of sovereignty).
Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).
Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2012).
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its threshold disposal of meritorious equal protection claims, which
other courts have likewise employed.
1. Aliessa Applies Strict Scrutiny
The New York Court of Appeals was the first state high court to
hold that the discretion that § 1622 accords states does not constitute
a uniform rule, and therefore strict scrutiny remains the appropriate
166
New York arstandard of review for state alienage classifications.
gued in Aliessa that the court should apply rational basis review to a
state statute that denied qualified aliens and PRUCOLs (who are
nonimmigrants) access to a state-funded health benefit that it offered
167
to its resident citizens. The state contended that because it was implementing a federal immigration policy at the direction of Congress
168
through PRWORA, Mathews’s rule of deferential review must apply.
Unlike the Soskin court’s analysis that would follow three years later in the Tenth Circuit, the Aliessa court properly read Graham (and
169
Plyler ) as limiting deferential review to when the federal govern170
ment dictates an alienage classification by uniform rule. PRWORA
does not meet the uniformity requirement, the court noted, because
§§ 1621 and 1622 allow the states to extend or restrict benefits for aliens, “producing not uniformity, but potentially wide variation based
on localized or idiosyncratic concepts of largesse, economics and pol171
itics.”
The court also recognized that § 1622’s constitutional infirmity is
even greater than what Graham instructed would be suspect. Graham
said that a congressional authorization for states to adopt nonuniform eligibility requirements for “federally supported welfare”
172
benefits would appear to contravene the Naturalization Clause.
The Aliessa decision explains that § 1622 goes well beyond this suspect ground by authorizing states to bar legally residing aliens from a
173
state-funded benefit.
As such, the court concluded that New York’s
statute “must be evaluated as any other State statute that classifies
166

167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1097-98 (discussing the uniformity requirement and concluding
that Title IV of PRWORA “does not impose a uniform immigration rule for States to follow”).
Id. at 1091–92 (describing New York’s Social Services Law § 122).
Id. at 1096–97.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1981).
Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1096 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 382 (1971).
Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098.
Graham, 403 U.S. at 382.
Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098.
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based on alienage” because § 1622’s authorization did not alter the
174
power of any state to discriminate against legally residing aliens.
Applying the strict scrutiny standard that such state classifications require, the court held that New York’s statute violated the Equal Pro175
tection Clause.
Aliessa also reached the right result because the power that states
exercise under § 1622 is distinct from and weaker than the power
Congress exercised in setting the Medicare eligibility requirements
that Mathews upheld. If we conceive a state-level exclusion of aliens
from state public benefits as an exercise of inherent state police pow176
er, then § 1622’s authorization to discriminate cures only the
177
preemption defect found in Graham; the equal protection violation
remains. But if instead the exclusion is an exercise of devolved, federal power, then we must evaluate how that power stacks against the
expansive power that Mathews recognized.
The power that PRWORA ostensibly devolved to the states in
§ 1622 is the federal power to regulate eligibility for a solely statefunded benefit. That power is weaker than the power to set conditions on who can benefit from federal funds (e.g., eligibility for Medicare) because it encroaches on the states’ sovereign prerogatives to
178
make their own spending decisions.
This difference in powers is
what distinguishes § 1622 from § 1612(b), where Congress purported
to devolve to states the power to set alien eligibility for joint-funded
179
benefit programs.
The substantial federal funds granted to jointfunded programs provide a direct link to Congress’s power under the
Spending Clause, while the link in the § 1622 context is more tenu180
ous because the benefit is solely state-funded.
174
175
176
177
178

179

180

Id.
Id. at 1098-99.
See,e.g., Huntington, supra note 9, at 820 (discussing how cases from the mid-nineteenth
century “express[ed] approval of state immigration laws based on state police powers”).
403 U.S. at 374.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987) (discussing how Congress cannot
command the states to spend state funds to its liking; rather, it may cajole state cooperation using its Spending Clause powers by offering federal funds with attached conditions).
A conditional grant of federal funds for joint-funded benefit programs is a wellestablished exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. E.g., Rosemary B.
Guiltinan, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Preemption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect
Medicaid Recipients’ Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (2010) (describing Medicaid as one such program enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause).
Federal rules controlling the provision of solely state-funded benefits would effectively be
a “cross-cutting” spending condition tied to federal funds granted to the same state agency that administers such benefits. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between
Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Ad-
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In other words, Congress’s power to set eligibility for benefits
(whether exercised itself or devolved) is strongest when the benefit
consists of only federal funds and attenuates as the benefit becomes
more and more state-funded. Congress has many ways to manipulate
181
and influence state spending, but its power to directly control its
own funds is nevertheless greater than its power to influence, but not
182
command, the spending of state funds.
The upshot of this assessment of background powers at work in
PRWORA is further support for Aliessa’s conclusion with respect to
congressional authorization of state-made eligibility requirements.
The court found that if, per Graham, such authorizations were constitutionally suspect with regard to federally supported benefits, then
solely state-funded benefits must engender an even greater constitu183
tional defect. The foregoing analysis bolsters that finding and further demonstrates why state choices that prefer citizens over aliens in
the allocation of state welfare dollars are subject to strict scrutiny,
even under the guise of federal approval.
2. Pham: Wrongly Avoiding Equal Protection Review
Not all challenges to the exclusion of legally residing aliens from
state public-benefit programs map squarely onto Aliessa’s analytical
184
framework.
In Aliessa, the state benefit denied to legally residing
aliens was offered to New York’s resident citizens. But in cases such
185
186
as Pham, Bruns v. Mayhew, and Khrapunskiy v. Doar, the state benefits in dispute were available only to certain legal aliens and not to cit-

181

182

183
184

185
186

ministrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1240 (2004) (contrasting programmatic spending
conditions, such as Medicaid and TANF, with cross-cutting spending conditions).
For an extensive treatment of the constitutional dimensions of Congress exercising its
power through conditional spending, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989)(criticizing the Supreme Court’s traditional
analysis of unconstitutional conditions on governmental benefits).
See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1629, 1631–32 (2006)(arguing for a standards and balancing approach to analyzing
the anti-commandeering doctrine rather than a rules based approach).
Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001).
See Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 404 (Mass. 2002) (scrutinizing Massachusetts’s six-month alien residency requirement); see also Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (scrutinizing the Colorado legislature’s removal of
the optional Medicaid coverage that it had previously provided to legal aliens); Ehrlich v.
Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006) (describing the state benefit for a class of aliens “newly
excluded” from federal Medicaid).
931 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Me. 2013).
909 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 2009). Similar cases are Doe, 773 N.E. 2d at 407, and Perez, 908 A.2d
at 1227 (concerning programs that provided benefits to legally residing alien women and
children whose benefits were eliminated by the Welfare Reform Act).
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izens. Some courts have cited this difference from Aliessa to wrongly
dismiss claims, concluding that the alien plaintiffs were not similarly
187
situated to anyone receiving preferential treatment from the state.
Their overly narrow conceptions of class-comparison analysis has led
them to conclude that states have drawn no alienage classification at
all and to therefore reject equal protection claims that in fact have
188
merit.
I will review the Pham decision to provide an example of this misguided analysis and to make two related points in support of properly
defining the similarly situated classes in these types of equal protection challenges. First, assessing whether plaintiffs are similarly situated to a favorably treated class is part of the substantive equal protection analysis and is not a separate threshold requirement that
plaintiffs must overcome. Second, funding comparable benefits
through a single program or separate programs is a formal distinction that does not dictate whether two beneficiaries are similarly situated.
189
Pham addressed a challenge brought by a class of QAs<5 in
190
Connecticut to the loss of two solely state-funded health benefits.
One benefit was exclusively for aliens and the other, as in Aliessa, was
191
Connecticut created the alien-only
open to aliens and citizens.
benefit, called State Medical Assistance for Noncitizens (SMANC), in
1997 to provide medical assistance to aliens excluded by PRWORA
192
from its Medicaid program.
SMANC is akin to the alien-only supplemental TAFDC benefit at issue in Doe, which was designed to assist
193
aliens who PRWORA rendered ineligible for federal TANF funds.
The other benefit at issue in Pham was the “State Administered Gen194
eral Assistance Medical program (SAGA-medical).”
187

188

189
190
191
192
193
194

E.g., Bruns, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (following the analysis articulated in Pham and concluding that “the Plaintiffs are unable show [sic] they were similarly situated with citizens
for equal protection purposes”); see also Khrapunskiy, 909 N.E.2d at 77 (“As there is no
state program of aid for this class, there are no state residents receiving public assistance
from New York at the level requested by plaintiffs.”).
See, e.g., Recent Cases, Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — New York Court of Appeals Hold
That State May Restrict Legal Alien Access to Disability Benefits — Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 123
HARV. L. REV. 800, 803 (2010) (criticizing New York’s Khrapunskiy decision for erring in
“refusing to conduct an equal protection analysis” which would have “turn[ed] the case
for the plaintiffs”).
Recall that “QAs<5” is my shorthand for qualified aliens that have yet to meet the five-year
residency threshold for Medicaid and TANF eligibility.
Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 637–38 (Conn. 2011).
Id. at 641–42.
Id. at 641.
Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Mass. 2002).
Pham, 16 A.3d at 642.
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Until 2009, low-income citizens and legally residing aliens were el195
igible for SAGA-medical if they were not eligible for Medicaid. Responding to budgetary pressures, the Connecticut legislature passed
Spec. Sess. P.A. 09-05, “which substantially eliminated SMANC,”
thereby “terminat[ing] publicly funded medical assistance for most
recipients,” and effectively excluded the plaintiff aliens from SAGA196
medical.
A trial court enjoined the state from terminating the Pham plaintiffs’ benefits in both programs, but that injunction was short-lived.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, concluding that neither
the elimination of SMANC nor the exclusion of aliens from SAGAmedical discriminated on the basis of alienage and thus did not vio197
late the Equal Protection Clause.
Rather than reach the issue of
whether rational basis review or strict scrutiny should apply to “state
classifications based on alienage that are authorized by the federal
government,” the court instead held that the challenged statutory
198
provisions “[did] not discriminate on the basis of alienage.”
The
court concluded that only persons still enrolled in SMANC were simi199
larly situated to the plaintiff class.
The first problem with Pham’s analysis is that its inquiry into
whether “the state is affording different treatment to similarly situat200
ed groups of individuals” as a “threshold requirement” is not rooted
201
Altin the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.
202
hough many state courts and lower federal courts, including the

195
196
197
198
199

200
201

202

Id.
Id. at 641–43.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 648. The court alternatively held that even if the plaintiffs in the class were similarly
situated to citizens enrolled in Medicaid, the state-drawn classification was based on eligibility for Medicaid, not alienage. Id. at 657–58, 662. I explain in Part III.D. why this alternative holding is likewise unfounded.
Pham, 16 A.3d at 645.
See Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 581, 598 (2011) (reviewing
Supreme Court precedent and concluding that the Court “has not historically viewed
[the phrase ‘similarly situated’] as a separate, threshold requirement, but rather as one
and the same as the equal protection merits inquiry”).
E.g., People v. Buffington, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 701 (“If persons are not similarly situated
for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails at the threshold.”); Brazas v. Prop.
Tax Appeal Bd., 791 N.E.2d 614, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“The threshold inquiry in equal
protection analysis is whether similarly situated persons are treated dissimilarly.”); In re
Weisberger, 169 P.3d 321, 328 (Kan. 2007) (“[A] threshold requirement for stating an
equal protection claim is to demonstrate that the challenged statutory enactment treats
‘arguably indistinguishable’ classes of people differently.” (citation omitted)).
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First, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, have treated class comparisons as an independent threshold inquiry, Professor Giovanna
Shay has noted that the Supreme Court refers to “similarly situated”
classes when applying “rational review with bite” and “intermediate
207
scrutiny.”
These are two versions of the substantive equal protec208
tion “fit” analysis, not separate threshold inquiries. Moreover, Shay
observed that the phrase rarely appears in Supreme Court decisions
concerning suspect classifications, bolstering her argument that the
phrase describes substantive equal protection principles rather than
209
acts as a prerequisite to applying those principles. Indeed, if a “similarly-situated” showing were a true threshold requirement, it would
apply to cases involving suspect and non-suspect classifications alike.
The second problem with Pham is that, putting aside whether the
210
similarly-situated inquiry is an independent threshold analysis, the
court wrongly concluded that the plaintiffs were similarly situated on211
ly to other SMANC recipients.
Instead, the court should have
viewed plaintiffs as similarly situated to all other Connecticut residents with comparable characteristics that are relevant to the purpos212
es of providing need-based medical assistance (such as income, re203

204

205

206

207

208
209
210

211
212

Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Here, we look for two elements: (1) whether the appellant was treated differently than others similarly situated,
and (2) whether such a difference was based on an impermissible consideration, such as
race.”).
Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a threshold showing
that she is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim.”).
Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Only once this threshold showing is made may a court proceed to inquire whether the basis of the discrimination merits
strict scrutiny.”).
Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (“The threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is, therefore,
‘to determine whether a person is similarly situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treatment.’” (quoting United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir.
1995))).
Shay, supra note 201, at 613–14 (noting the prominence of the phrase in Supreme Court
cases invalidating legislative classifications under rational basis review and “presag[ing
the] appearance of intermediate scrutiny” as a standard of review).
Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 614 (“By contrast, the phrase ‘similarly situated’ did not figure as prominently in
race cases that were reviewed under strict scrutiny.”).
I make this argument because the “threshold” version of the similarly-situated inquiry is
pervasive in state and lower federal courts, see supra notes 202–06, and appears unlikely to
be corrected soon.
Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 648–49 (Conn. 2011).
See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 345–46 (1949) (noting common errors in applying the “similarly situated” analysis
and concluding that “[t]he inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classifica-
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sources, age, and disability status) and who are receiving benefits
funded at least partially by the state. Getting this class comparison
213
correct is fundamental to an adequate equal protection review.
To conclude that plaintiffs were not similarly situated to citizens
enrolled in Medicaid, the Pham court noted that SMANC was a separate program from Connecticut’s Medicaid program. Only aliens
could enroll in the former, while citizens (and certain aliens not
barred by PRWORA) could enroll in the latter. But the separation of
comparable benefits into two programs or the combination of such
benefits into a single program is a formal distinction without a differ214
ence for the purpose of determining a similarly situated class. The
Ninth Circuit explained in Pimentel that a state “could not evade strict
scrutiny simply by first authorizing one state-funded program for citizens and certain aliens and another for a subclass of aliens, and then
215
canceling the latter.” For instance, Massachusetts’ Commonwealth
Care program at issue in Finch was administered as a single program,
216
with some enrollees funded solely by state funds. But the state just
as well could have administered the benefits in separate programs,
217
much as it did with primary and supplemental TAFDC. This strictly
formal alteration would not render the beneficiaries of each program
differently situated.
In sum, the problems that I have identified in Pham are not
unique to that decision. Other courts have applied a threshold ver218
sion of the similarly-situated analysis, concluding that no equal protection review was required because the plaintiffs could not be compared to individuals receiving benefits in a separate benefit program

213
214

215
216
217
218

tion to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”); see also Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882–83 (Iowa 2009) (explaining that “equal protection demands
that laws treat alike all people who are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes
of the law” and that “[t]he purposes of the law must be referenced in order to meaningfully evaluate whether the law equally protects all people similarly situated with respect to
those purposes” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See infra Part III.A.
See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that
Washington’s “Basic Food Benefits” program, which used a single application form processed by the same state agency and did not communicate to recipients whether their
benefits were state or federal, was in fact “two separately administered programs funded
by two distinct sovereigns”).
Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1107.
Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (Mass.
2011).
Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Mass. 2002).
See Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1106; Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267 (D. Me. 2013).
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219

for which plaintiffs were never eligible.
Consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, the similarly-situated inquiry is best understood as
an expression of the substantive equal protection analysis. But where
it is applied as a threshold test, courts should not be confined by the
formal separation of two programs that provide essentially the same
type of benefit.
III. GUIDEPOSTS FOR ALIEN EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW
The decisions reviewed in Part II should be both instructive and
cautionary to state and federal courts that review similar equal protection challenges. This section will draw out the critical lessons from
those cases to provide courts with guideposts to follow in their assessments of equal protection suits brought by aliens whom states
have excluded from public-benefit programs. These guideposts will
help ensure that courts engage in the robust equal protection review
that Graham and Mathews require.
A. Guidepost One: Similarly Situated
In the preceding section, I argued that courts should not apply a
threshold similarly-situated analysis of aliens’ equal protection claims
because such class comparisons are properly understood as part of
the substantive equal protection review. I noted, however, that many
state courts and lower federal courts employ the threshold version
220
and are unlikely to depart from that practice.
For this reason I
propose a two-part test for assessing who is similarly situated to plaintiff aliens. Applying this test will avoid the Pham court’s error of
prematurely dismissing meritorious equal protection claims.
Before turning to my proposed test, I first consider the analysis
that the Ninth Circuit used in Pimentel. As noted above, Pimentel rejected the type of formalism on which Pham relied, where the state’s
decision to provide benefits through one program or many programs
would determine which beneficiaries were similarly situated to plaintiffs. Instead, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “[a] careful consideration of the contours of the [alien-excluding benefit program]” will
219

220

See Bruns, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (“Because citizens were statutorily unable to receive
health benefits under the same state-sponsored program, the Plaintiffs are unable to show
they were similarly situated with citizens for equal protection purposes.”); Khrapunskiy v.
Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70, 77 (N.Y. 2009) (“As there is no state program of aid for this class,
there are no state residents receiving public assistance from New York at the level requested by plaintiffs.”).
See supra note 210.
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demonstrate whether the beneficiaries of that program are similarly
221
situated to the plaintiff class. These “contours” include “the statutory scheme, source of funding, extent of state involvement, and his222
tory” of the benefit program.
223
This vague test was sufficient for the Pimentel court to reach the
right result in that case, but I predict that it will lead to inconsistent
results going forward. Indeed, the one lower federal court to have
employed it to date wrongly concluded that aliens terminated from a
solely state-funded health benefit program were not similarly situated
224
to individuals enrolled in Medicaid.
I argue instead that a court undertaking a similarly-situated inquiry need only make two determinations: (1) the similarity of plaintiffs to benefit-receiving individuals with regard to characteristics rel225
evant to the purpose of the benefit at issue; and (2) the degree to
which the state funds the benefit those individuals receive. The first
determination is no more than an expression of the basic equal protection principle that similarity and dissimilarity must be evaluated as
it relates to the purpose of the government (typically legislative) ac226
tion.
The second determination ensures that the difference in
treatment between the plaintiffs and the benefit-receiving individuals
is properly attributable to the state.
For example, suppose a state determines that low-income families
with children have a particular need for health benefits, and it provides those benefits through a joint-funded benefit program. The
relevant characteristics for determining the state’s residents who are
similarly situated with respect to these benefits would be income level
and number of children in the family. And the presence of state
funds in the joint-funded benefit program indicates that the state has
221
222
223

224

225

226

Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1108.
Id.
The court does not explain how (or to what degree) each of these “contours” is relevant
to the question of similarity between plaintiffs and a class receiving more favorable state
treatment. Id.
See Bruns, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (“After considering the ‘contours’ of the programs in
dispute, the Court concludes that there were two separate benefit programs: an aliensonly program and a program for citizens and qualified aliens who satisfied PRWORA’s
residency requirement.”).
To the degree this rule begs the questions, “How relevant must these characteristics be?”
and “What latitude does the state have in defining the purpose of the benefit?,” the answer is that, as argued above, this analysis is part and parcel to substantive equal protection
review. Thus, what may constitute the purpose of the benefit program and what is the
required degree of relevance between characteristics and purpose both depend on the
standard of review being applied.
See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 212, at 346 (“The inescapable answer is that we must
look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law.”).
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treated beneficiary families more favorably than low-income families
227
with children who are not beneficiaries. The non-beneficiary families would be similarly situated to the beneficiary families in an equal
protection suit against the state.
Applying my proposed similarly-situated analysis to the Pimentel
case would reach the same (correct) result that the Ninth Circuit
reached. The Pimentel court held that Washington’s resident citizens
receiving federal food benefits were dissimilarly situated from resident aliens who had received a now-terminated solely state-funded
food benefit, even though both benefits were administered as a single
228
program by a single state agency.
Plaintiffs in this case meet the
first part of my similarly-situated rule because they had similar rele229
vant characteristics (income level) to individuals receiving federal
food benefits. But they fail the second part of my rule because state
funding of the federal food benefit program was nominal—the state
funded only fifty percent of the administrative costs of the program,
while the federal government funded the other half of those costs
230
and 100 percent of the benefits. This result makes sense because a
state should not be held responsible for the preferential treatment
that results from federal, not state, funding.
Applying this analysis to Pham, however, shows that the plaintiff
class was similarly situated to individuals receiving Medicaid benefits.
As in Pimentel, the plaintiffs had similar relevant characteristics (such
231
as age, income level, and disability status) to Medicaid recipients.
What distinguishes Pham from Pimentel is that whereas Washington’s
funding of the federal food benefit was nominal, Connecticut’s con232
tribution to its Medicaid program was upwards of $1.9 billion.
Thus, with respect to Connecticut’s support of need-based health
benefits, the plaintiff class of needy aliens who received no health
benefits was similarly situated to the needy citizens (and some aliens)
who received Medicaid.

227
228
229
230
231
232

If the characteristic that distinguishes the beneficiary and non-beneficiary families is suspect, such as alienage, then strict scrutiny is required.
Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1101, 1108.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1099, 1108; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2025 (2012) (requiring states to cover fifty percent of
the program’s administrative costs).
Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 642–43 (noting that the plaintiff class members
are categorically eligible for Medicaid).
Pham, 16 A.3d at 654.
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B. Guidepost Two: Alien Status
A court reviewing an alien’s equal protection challenge will quickly lose its way if it does not identify the plaintiff’s status as an alien
with as much particularity as possible. This status is critical to understanding how the alien and the benefits at issue fit within the
PRWORA scheme. Contrary to assertions made in the opinions re233
viewed above, an alien’s status under PRWORA is not binary, so it
will not suffice to determine merely whether an alien is “qualified.”
PRWORA provides different eligibility rules for state and federal public benefits depending on whether an individual is a qualified alien, a
234
nonimmigrant, or an undocumented alien.
Grouping nonimmigrants with undocumented aliens runs the risk of wrongly applying
rational basis review instead of strict scrutiny to a state’s exclusion of
235
nonimmigrants from a state public benefit.
Courts must also pay attention to other characteristics of the
plaintiff alien that affect eligibility under PRWORA, such as the date
when the alien first entered the United States and how long the alien
has resided with qualified status, because those characteristics dictate
how much discretion a state may exercise. As I explain further in the
following subsection, recognizing which aspects of a state’s publicbenefit scheme are discretionary and which are federally mandated is
critical to determining the proper standard of equal protection review to apply. Courts should apply strict scrutiny when states, rather
than Congress, exercise discretion to restrict benefits for a class of aliens.
C. Guidepost Three: Uniform Federal Rule
Once the court has identified the plaintiff’s alien status, the court
should determine whether he or she is subject to a uniform federal
rule under PRWORA. These uniform rules in PRWORA include the
five-year bar for qualified aliens and the permanent bar for nonimmigrants from joint-funded benefit programs. Determining the applicability of a uniform federal rule helps to define what a state must
233

234
235

See, e.g., Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (D. Me. 2013) (“PRWORA divided
noncitizens into two groups for Medicaid eligibility: qualified and non-qualified aliens.”);
Pham, 16 A.3d at 640 (“[PRWORA] divides aliens into two groups: qualified and nonqualified aliens.”); Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 406 n.2
(Mass. 2002) (“A ‘qualified alien’ is one who has some legal residency status in the United
States. An alien who is not ‘qualified’ does not.” (citation omitted)).
See supra Part I.B.
For example, the supplemental TAFDC program in Doe extended benefits to qualified
aliens, but not to nonimmigrants. 773 N.E.2d at 407.
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provide its alien residents to comport with the command of equal
protection. For instance, QAs<5 excluded from Medicaid or TANF
programs on account of the five-year bar have the right to only a prorata match of the state’s contribution to those Medicaid or TANF
236
programs. But if Congress has not made a class of aliens ineligible
for a benefit, then any state effort to exclude such aliens must be reviewed under strict scrutiny and the appropriate remedy is enroll237
ment in the benefit program.
When, like in Soskin, PRWORA does not categorically bar the alien
class from joint-funded benefit programs, a state that eliminates aliens from such programs contravenes the equal protection rationale
of the Graham holding. The state denies aliens state funds that it contributes for the benefit of similarly-situated citizens. But these situa238
tions also implicate the federalism rationale of Graham because the
state also blocks alien access to federal funds that federal policy
would permit. Granted, federal policy also permits denying these aliens federal support, but a state-by-state determination of alien access
to federal support creates a non-uniform immigration policy and
239
raises the federalism concern of political accountability.
For example, a qualified alien is unlikely to know that his ineligibility for Medicaid is a federal policy for his first five years of qualified
status but an optional state policy thereafter. Obscuring the source
of a policy encumbers the mobilization of political forces against that
policy. Both the federalism and equal protection concerns that led
the Graham court to apply strict scrutiny are present when state policy
is akin to Colorado’s statute in Soskin.
In contrast, if a court confronts a situation like Doe, where the alien class falls under PRWORA’s five-year bar or other uniform rule
regarding eligibility for a joint-funded benefit, then the court should
apply Mathews deference, but only to Congress’s choice to deny the
aliens federal funds. PRWORA does not prevent states from creating
alien-only state-funded benefits, such as supplemental TAFDC in Doe.
Thus, a state’s participation in a joint-funded benefit without contributing equal pro-rata funds to an alien-eligible benefit is a state,
not federal, policy that treats aliens unequally on the basis of their al-

236

237
238
239

But if the state is providing its citizen residents additional benefits outside of Medicaid
that it is denying its alien residents, comparable benefits must be provided to aliens as
well.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 20.
See Carrasco, supra note 28, at 628. See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (discussing the tie between political accountability and federalism).
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ienage. This point will be explored in further detail in my next
guidepost.
D. Guidepost Four: Adopted Alienage Classifications
Courts must also be aware of the precise extent of PRWORA’s uniform rules. Although these rules prohibit certain aliens’ enrollments
in joint-funded benefit programs, they actual block these aliens’ receipt of federal-funded support. The reason is because PRWORA allows states to create solely state-funded programs that provide excluded aliens the same types of benefits that citizens and nonexcluded aliens (e.g., aliens with five years of qualified status) receive
from the joint-funded programs. For example, Connecticut created
its SMANC program to give health benefits to aliens that PRWORA
240
rendered ineligible for Medicaid. PRWORA’s uniform rule blocked
these aliens from receiving health benefits supported by federal
funds, but they nonetheless received health benefits supported by
state funds.
Understanding this limited scope of PRWORA’s uniform rules
clarifies that a state’s participation in a joint-funded benefit program
does not require the state to adopt the alienage classifications inher241
ent to the program’s eligibility rules.
Courts have failed to recognize that states retain the choice of whether to adopt for receipt of
their own welfare dollars any or all of the federally imposed eligibility
criteria (whether alienage-related or otherwise) attached to jointfunded benefit programs.
To be clear, I do not mean that states can ignore federal eligibility
rules and enroll individuals that Congress has barred. Instead, I
mean that states can provide separate, solely state-funded benefits to
a class of individuals excluded from the joint-funded benefit program
because of any given criteria (e.g., income level, age, or alienage). By
so doing, state participation in the joint-funded benefit program no
longer accords preferential treatment to individuals meeting those
eligibility criteria.

240
241

Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 641 (Conn. 2011).
This point undermines the Pham court’s alternative holding that Connecticut’s participating in Medicaid “does not discriminate on the basis of alienage” because the classification
is between those who meet the federal criteria for Medicaid and those who do not. See id.
at 657–59. By providing aliens no health benefits whatsoever, Connecticut adopted an alienage classification that PRWORA did not require—contributing significant state funds
to a Medicaid program that helps citizens (and excludes most aliens) while failing to provide equal funding to a health-benefit program for aliens.
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This guidepost requires some unpacking. To do this, I will first
use a simple hypothetical to show how states adopt federal classifications as their own through their funding of joint-funded benefit programs. I will then use Pham as a real-world example of a state using
solely state-funded benefits to reject some of the non-suspect classifications that the federal government imposes on Medicaid programs,
while retaining the federally imposed alienage classifications.
Suppose, for example, that two individuals are similarly situated in
every respect except that X is blind and Y is sighted. Pursuant to
Medicaid’s eligibility criteria, X receives Medicaid benefits but Y does
not. A state’s funding of part of X’s Medicaid benefits constitutes
preferential state treatment of X over Y. In other words, the state is
classifying on the basis of blindness. But if the state provides equal
state funds to a separate health benefit for Y, the state would no longer be treating X and Y differently—there would no longer be a statelevel blindness classification. The state would thus participate in
Medicaid without adopting Medicaid’s classification based on blindness. And the same principle holds for Medicaid’s (or TANF’s) alienage classifications because no federal law impedes the states from
providing solely state-funded benefits to aliens barred from Medicaid
242
(or TANF).
The facts in Pham demonstrate how a state can participate in Medicaid but draw classifications different from those that Congress drew
in establishing the baselines for Medicaid eligibility. Through its
SAGA-medical program, Connecticut uses state funds to extend Medicaid-like benefits to a subset of individuals who do not meet one of
243
Medicaid’s “categorical eligibility” criteria. A low-income Connecticut resident who was not aged, blind, disabled, pregnant, or a parent
of a dependent child could nonetheless qualify for the solely statefunded SAGA-medical program. As with the separate state-funded
benefit in my blindness hypothetical, Connecticut’s provision of
SAGA-medical essentially negates the classifications that the state’s
participation in Medicaid would otherwise draw.
Prior to the 2009 enactment of the statute challenged in Pham,
Connecticut likewise negated the alienage classification that is otherwise inherent to Medicaid participation. It achieved this by providing
SMANC and SAGA-medical to aliens excluded from Medicaid. But its
242
243

See 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012) (allowing states to determine alien eligibility for state public
benefits).
This phrase “generally refers to those who are disabled, blind, pregnant, a parent of a
dependent child, or an individual under twenty-one years of age or sixty-five years of age
or older.” Pham, 16 A.3d at 639 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a) (2006)).
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elimination of SMANC and exclusion from SAGA-medical of individuals ineligible for Medicaid because of alienage (while still providing
SAGA-medical to persons ineligible for Medicaid because of other
criteria) shows how Connecticut selected which aspects of Medicaid
eligibility criteria it would adopt (alienage) and which it would reject
(certain categorical eligibility criteria).
In sum, PRWORA contains a uniform mandate that federal funds
not support benefits for certain aliens. But courts must not interpret
this as a mandate that states commit more of their funds to the support of their in-need citizen populations than their in-need alien
populations. That decision is left to the states. States that fund a
separate benefit program for aliens at an equal pro-rata level as they
fund a Medicaid or TANF program do not classify based on alienage;
states that fund Medicaid and TANF programs with no separate benefits for excluded aliens have voluntarily adopted alienage classifications.
E. Guidepost Five: Sources and Levels of Funding
The essential lesson from Graham and Mathews is that the federal
government has much wider latitude to make decisions that treat al244
iens and citizens differently than do state governments. This lesson
forms the foundation of what must anchor a court’s equal protection
analysis in the PRWORA context. Rather than confine its analysis to
the eligibility requirement of a particular benefit and which government entity created that requirement, the court should look more
broadly to the public-benefit scheme as a whole and ask: Has the
state decided to devote its resources to the benefit of its resident citizens that it has not likewise devoted to its resident aliens?
By looking beyond the facial classification to root out underlying
state policy decisions that disadvantage aliens based on the fact of
their alienage, courts will shut off a back-door method for Congress
245
to authorize states to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Without
this robust judicial review, nothing but political pressure will prevent
states from funneling more and more of their funds through a federal program to benefit citizens over aliens. The futility of a discreet
and insular minority’s reliance on the political process is a fundamental justification for the judiciary’s role in enforcing the mandates
246
of equal protection. This justification is especially salient when that
244
245
246

See discussion, supra Part I.
See supra, note 134.
See supra, note 18.
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minority is a class of aliens, who by definition lack the basic tool of
247
political power: the vote.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS
Proper attention to the guideposts outlined in Part III brings into
focus the equal protection violations that result not only from reductions or terminations of existing public benefits for aliens, but also
from the basic structures of state public-benefit schemes in the
PRWORA era. Whereas class actions brought by aliens to date have
focused on the former, judicial recognition of the latter would significantly expand the scope of aliens asserting their rights of equal access to public benefits. Far more states have structured their publicbenefit programs to the disadvantage of aliens than have first provided, then reduced or terminated, benefits for aliens. The following
Part will describe three characteristics of these structures that render
state-funded and joint-funded benefit programs equal protection violations. In each section I will recommend actions that state legislatures can take to remedy these violations.
The first characteristic I will address is the denial of a joint-funded
benefit to aliens for whom PRWORA does not bar eligibility by uniform rule. Examples include denials of Medicaid and TANF benefits,
as well as benefits under the Children’s Health Insurance Program
248
(CHIP). Next, I will turn to the expansion of joint-funded benefits
for a state’s resident citizens but not aliens. States can expand these
benefits using solely state funds (administered within the jointfunded benefit program or as a separate, supplemental benefit) or
using both state and federal funds in a § 1115 demonstration pro249
ject.
Finally, I address the choice to commingle state and federal
funds in the provision of public benefits.
A. Soskin Situations
State public-benefit schemes that deny joint-funded benefits to aliens for whom federal law permits eligibility are unconstitutional because they effect alienage classifications as a matter of state discretion. With regard to most qualified aliens, PRWORA allows the states
to determine eligibility for not only solely state-funded benefit pro247
248
249

See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 341 (1993)(“The [Supreme] Court has viewed the vote primarily as a tool for exerting political power.”).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2006) (providing no uniform bar for eligibility for “child
health assistance to uninsured, low-income children”).
See supra note 107.
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grams,
but also joint-funded benefit programs.
Although
PRWORA uniformly bars qualified aliens from receiving these jointfunded benefits for five years, states have discretion under § 1612(b)
to effectively extend that bar. States may also deny joint-funded ben252
efit eligibility to pre-enactment qualified aliens, a population that
253
PRWORA does not uniformly exclude from such benefit programs.
Examples of states exercising this discretion in a manner that classifies based on alienage are seen in the Medicaid, TANF, and CHIP
contexts.
1. Denying Federally Available Medicaid and TANF Benefits
As noted in the discussion of Soskin in Part II.B.1 above, Colorado
exercised § 1612(b) discretion to make alien eligibility for parts of its
254
Medicaid program more restrictive than Congress required. Other
states have elected this restrictive option as well, limiting Medicaid
benefits for aliens arriving in the United States after PRWORA’s enactment to only those qualified aliens for whom PRWORA requires
255
coverage. These states include Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota,
256
Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming.
Similarly, states have restricted qualified aliens’ eligibility for
TANF benefits beyond PRWORA’s five-year bar. For instance, Indiana and Kansas provide TANF benefits after five years only to qualified aliens who are refugees, asylees, and “persons granted a with257
holding of deportation,” while Idaho and Texas limit these benefits
250
251

252

253
254
255
256
257

See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (2012) (providing that, except for the mandatory five-year bar, “a
State is authorized to determine the eligibility of an alien who is a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title) for [TANF, social services block grants, and Medicaid]”). States do not have such discretion under PRWORA with regard to joint-funded
benefits for a small subset of qualified aliens that include refugees, asylees, veterans,
members of the military, and legal permanent residences with credit for forty qualifying
quarters of work. See also id. § 1612(b)(2) (2012) (listing such exceptions).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(D) (2012) (mandating joint-funded benefit eligibility for preenactment lawfully residing aliens only until January 1, 1997); see also KARINA FORTUNY &
AJAY CHAUDRY, URBAN INSTITUTE, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 9 (2011) (noting certain subsets of qualified aliens for
which TANF and Medicaid eligibility is mandatory, but that “[s]tates can determine eligibility for all other qualified immigrants”).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2012) (stating that the statutorily required five-year ineligibility
applies only to aliens “who enter[] the United States on or after August 22, 1996”).
See supra note 139.
See supra note 251.
FORTUNY & CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 13–14. Wyoming also restricts Medicaid coverage for aliens arriving prior to PRWORA’s enactment. Id.
Id. at 31.
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to only those qualified aliens who are battered spouses or children.
Mississippi and North Dakota are the most restrictive states, providing
TANF benefits to only those qualified aliens for whom PRWORA
259
mandates eligibility.
These states are denying qualified aliens benefits supported by
both state and federal funds. And unlike aliens who are ineligible for
federally supported benefits because of the five-year bar, these aliens
would be eligible for such benefits were it not for the states’ decisions
260
to restrict eligibility. Graham suggests that a federal authorization of
state-by-state alien-eligibility determinations contravenes the Naturalization Clause’s uniformity requirement and thus cannot exempt the261
se state alienage classifications from strict scrutiny review.
And
states are unlikely to satisfy strict scrutiny because they lack a compelling state interest for which these alienage classifications are the least
262
restrictive means of advancement.
Thus, state public-benefit
schemes that are more restrictive of alien eligibility for joint-funded
benefit programs than PRWORA requires are unconstitutional.
2. CHIP Eligibility
Another important variant of “Soskin situations” that effects a statelevel alienage classification is a state’s barring legally residing children and pregnant women from receiving benefits under CHIP.
263
Created by federal statute in 1997, CHIP funding expands healthbenefit coverage to otherwise Medicaid-ineligible children and preg-

258
259
260
261

262

263

Id. at 31–32. These populations covered by Indiana, Kansas, Idaho, and Texas are in addition to the qualified aliens for whom PRWORA mandates coverage. See supra note 252.
Id. at 31–32.
For instance, thirty-nine states provide TANF benefits to all qualified aliens after the fiveyear bar. Id.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (noting that since “[u]nder Art. I,
§ 8, cl 4, of the Constitution, Congress’ power is to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’” allowing each state “to adopt divergent . . . citizenship requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity”).
See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (describing what a state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage must do to withstand strict scrutiny); see also Soskin v.
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The parties appear to agree that SB
03-176 would not survive strict scrutiny . . . .”); cf. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins.
Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012) (holding that Massachusetts’s exclusion from Commonwealth Care of aliens who are ineligible for federal support did not
satisfy strict scrutiny).
See generally Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33,, tit. I, subtit. J, 111 Stat. 251,
275 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–1397mm).
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264

nant women.
Under the CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009
265
(CHIPRA), states can choose whether to extend such coverage to
266
267
lawfully residing alien children and pregnant women. The statute
gives states this discretion explicitly notwithstanding the PRWORA
provisions (e.g., the five-year bar or the required status as a qualified
alien) that would make certain alien children and pregnant women
268
otherwise ineligible for federally supported benefits. States may also cover pregnant women, regardless of immigration status, through
269
CHIP’s “unborn child” option.
270
Despite the availability of federal funds, twenty-nine states did
not provide health-benefit coverage to lawfully residing children under CHIP, and twenty-five states denied such coverage to lawfully re271
siding pregnant women.
Thus, lawfully residing children and
pregnant women in these states who are ineligible for Medicaid or
stand-alone CHIP benefits because of an exercise of state discretion
264

265
266
267

268
269

270
271

CHIP, like Medicaid, is a joint-funded program administered by the states. See Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.
medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Childrens-HealthInsurance-Program-CHIP/Childrens-Health-Insurance-Program-CHIP.html (noting that
the program “provides health coverage to nearly eight million children in families with
incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid, but can’t afford private coverage”); see also id.
(noting that states have the option to incorporate CHIP as an expansion of their existing
Medicaid program (as elected by seven states, the District of Columbia, and five territories), to maintain CHIP as a separate benefit program (as elected by seventeen states) or
a combination of Medicaid expansion and separate program (as elected by twenty-six
states)); id. (stating that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat 119, 286 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(b)) provides that the federal matching rate for CHIP after 2015 will increase an additional “23 percentage points,
bringing the average federal matching rate for CHIP to 93%”). Thus, states that do not
allow their resident aliens to participate in CHIP will soon be denying that population a
benefit that is almost entirely federal-funded.
Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396).
This is a broader category than “qualified aliens” under PRWORA. FORTUNY AND
CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 14.
Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. for the Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services, to State
Health Officials (July 1, 2010), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archiveddownloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO10006.pdf; see also FORTUNY AND CHAUDRY, supra
note 252, at 4.
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(4)(A) (2006).
FORTUNY AND CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 14 (citing Letter from Jackie Garner, Acting
Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Health Officials (May 11, 2009),
available at https://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SHO051109.pdf.
Moreover, these federal funds are available at a higher matching rate than standard Medicaid reimbursement. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 264.
FORTUNY AND CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 16. These figures are current as of March
2011. Eight states had pending amendments to their Medicaid or CHIP plans to provide
coverage to children and/or pregnant women. Id. at 14. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia provided coverage to pregnant women directly, through the unborn
child option, or both. Id. at 16.
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have viable equal protection claims. Again, these state-by-state alieneligibility determinations warrant strict scrutiny because they are not
the product of a uniform federal rule, and the states will be unlikely
to meet that exacting review.
3. Remedying the Violation
States that are denying joint-funded benefits to aliens for whom
PRWORA does not bar eligibility can remedy these “Soskin situation”
equal protection violations by enrolling the aliens in the joint-funded
benefit programs—be it Medicaid, TANF, or CHIP—as they would
similarly situated citizens. A separate, state-funded, alien-only benefit
would be an insufficient remedy because these aliens are eligible for
federal support, and the state has no compelling interest in obstructing that support. Nor can the states constitutionally place restrictions, such as durational residency requirements, on aliens’ receipt of these benefits that are not applied to citizens. States need to
amend their statutory or regulatory eligibility rules that currently bar,
due to alienage, any individual from enrolling in a joint-funded benefit program that PRWORA does not require to be so barred.
B. Expanding Joint-Funded Benefits for Citizens but Not Aliens
The next characteristic of state public benefit schemes that implicates certain aliens’ equal protection rights is the expansion of jointfunded benefit programs (or the creation of state substitute programs) to cover persons otherwise ineligible for such benefits, while
still excluding classes of aliens. Two basic ways of achieving this selective expansion are through creating a state-funded program to provide a benefit comparable to that provided in the joint-funded pro272
gram and through § 1115 demonstration projects.
Connecticut’s
SAGA-medical program, for instance, used state funds to provide
medical assistance to persons categorically ineligible for Medicaid,
273
but not to persons ineligible for Medicaid solely due to alien status.
272
273

See BAUMRUCKER, supra note 107.
See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (discussing Pham). Another example of
selective expansion through a state-funded program is found in Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d
451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). New Jersey excluded qualified aliens and nonimmigrants from its state-funded FamilyCare, “a state program created to provide subsidized
health insurance coverage to low-income [families] . . . whose family incomes are too
high for them to be eligible for traditional Medicaid.” Id. at 468. See also Avila v. Biedess,
78 P.3d 280, 287–88 (upholding under strict scrutiny review Arizona’s Premium Sharing
Program, which “is intended to be an extension of the [Medicaid] program available to
persons whose incomes exceed the [Medicaid] limits” but nonetheless excludes aliens).
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Similarly, Washington is an example of a state using federal funds secured through a § 1115 waiver, along with state funds, to provide
health insurance to its Medicaid-ineligible citizens but not to QAs<5
274
or nonimmigrants. And although both of these examples concern
275
Medicaid expansions, the same principle applies to TANF as well.
Both methods of selective expansion represent state choices to
expend additional state funds for benefits that exclude certain aliens.
Although the contours of state-funded benefit programs and § 1115
demonstration projects vary, each has the potential to violate the
Equal Protection Clause insofar as it contributes to a state’s discretionary and preferential treatment of certain residents on the basis of
alienage. Just as a state’s participation in a joint-funded benefit like
Medicaid is optional, so too is its choice to create a solely state-funded
health benefit or to apply for, and allocate funds to, a § 1115 demonstration project that aids Medicaid-ineligible citizens but not certain
Medicaid-ineligible aliens.
But unlike the “Soskin situations” described in the preceding subsection, remedying these equal protection violations does not require
states to enroll their alien residents into a joint-funded benefit program. Indeed, such a remedy would violate federal law to the extent
it would extend federally supported benefits to PRWORA-barred aliens. Nor does the Equal Protection Clause require states to use their
own funds to compensate for what the federal government with276
holds. The proper remedy is to support a solely state-funded benefit for aliens at the same pro-rata level that the state funds similar
benefits for citizens. Funding such a program would ensure that any
difference between the level of benefits that aliens and similarly situated citizens receive is solely on account of a uniform federal rule
and not state discretion, thus adhering both to Graham and Mathews.

274

275

276

Unthaksinkun v. Porter, No. C11–0588JLR, 2011 WL 4502050 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28,
2011) (noting that the Washington program requires beneficiaries to be a “qualified alien
for at least five years”). Both the Commonwealth Care program at issue in Finch and the
Medicaid program at issue in Korab are also operated under § 1115 waivers.
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced in 2012 its willingness to consider § 1115 waivers, which have been common in the Medicaid context,
for TANF programs. Letter from George Sheldon, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., to State Human Service Officials (July 12, 2012), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/2012-ltr-gs-to-commissioners-im-201203.
See, e.g., Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1465–66 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause did not require California to compensate with state funds the
cash-assistance benefits that Congress prohibited to the plaintiff class of aliens).
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C. The Choice to Mix State and Federal Funds
The final and most prevalent characteristic of state public-benefit
schemes that violates aliens’ equal protection rights is the state-level
choice to commingle state and federal funds in a single benefit program without providing a separate benefit for excluded aliens. This
constitutional defect pervades the health-benefit schemes of at least
thirty-seven states and in the welfare-benefit schemes (i.e., TANF277
related benefit programs) of at least thirty-four states.
Because states’ participation in joint-funded benefit programs is
voluntary—they are free to maintain benefit programs independent
of federal funding or forgo providing benefits altogether—the combining of state and federal dollars is a matter of state discretion. This
choice is significant because federal funding of a benefit renders
many aliens (e.g., most QAs<5, and all nonimmigrants and undocumented aliens) mandatorily ineligible under PRWORA. In contrast,
if a state maintains a benefit program without federal funding, then
the state is free to provide the benefit to all of its resident aliens, regardless of legal status.
1. Comparing Commingling Options in Medicaid and TANF
Both Medicaid and TANF programs exemplify this final characteristic, but the exercise of state discretion to commingle funds is more
explicit in the latter program than the former. Federal Medicaid
funding requires commingling with state funds because it is structured as a reimbursement: The state spends its own money on covered services for its Medicaid-eligible population and recoups a certain percentage of those expenditures from the federal government.
No federal reimbursement is payable for state health-benefit programs that do not meet the program requirements set by federal law,
278
including PRWORA’s alien-eligibility rules.
Thus, states have a
choice to participate in Medicaid or not; but if they want federal
Medicaid dollars, then commingling is necessary for at least a portion
of the total state resources devoted to need-based medical assistance.
Still, states are free to maintain separate health-benefit programs
that do not meet Medicaid’s program requirements (e.g., provide
277

278

See infra notes 280, 290, and accompanying text. These estimates are based on states that
do not provide solely state-funded benefits to QAs<5, but that does not capture the full
extent of constitutionally defective state schemes. Other legally residing aliens excluded
from Medicaid or TANF programs have an equal protection right to separate state benefits as well.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006) (outlining the payment of federal funds to states).
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benefits to PRWORA-barred aliens) without suffering any penalty or
279
As explained in Part
reduction in their Medicaid reimbursement.
III.C. above, funding Medicaid programs without a separate healthbenefit provision for aliens effects a state alienage classification. But
only fourteen states and the District of Columbia provided any type of
280
solely state-funded health benefit to QAs<5 as of March 2011.
Health-benefit coverage of nonimmigrants is likewise limited, with
most states offering no such coverage and many states limiting the
281
coverage to specific subsets, such as children, aliens who were law282
fully present in the United States before PRWORA’s enactment, or
283
certain aliens who are in long-term care.
TANF is similar to Medicaid in that states must contribute their
284
own funds in order to qualify for federal funds (called “qualified
285
State expenditures” but commonly known as the “maintenance of
286
effort” requirement, or “MOE” ), but states may nonetheless maintain separate benefit programs. However, unlike Medicaid, states receive TANF funds as block grants, not reimbursements. Although
states must contribute a certain level of their own funds to programs
287
that promote one of the four overarching purposes specified by the
279

280
281
282
283
284
285
286

287

Of course, any funds dedicated to a non-Medicaid program represent funds that could
have been dedicated to the Medicaid program and thereby garnered additional federal
reimbursement. The Pham court proffered this point as a reason why in-need aliens were
not similarly situated to in-need citizens, but the availability of federal funds is properly
analyzed in the substantive equal protection analysis, where the court assesses the state’s
interest (e.g., maximizing federal reimbursement to provide the highest level of benefits
possible) and the relationship of the classification to that interest. Cf. Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding that a samesex couple’s alleged “diminished ability to discharge family roles in procreation and the
raising of children” pertains to whether a federal statute could withstand scrutiny, “rather
than upon the level of scrutiny to apply”).
FORTUNY & CHAUDRY, supra note 252, at 19.
Illinois, Florida, and Washington are examples. Id. at 16-17.
Ohio and Rhode Island are examples. Id.
This is the case in Virginia. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7) (2006); see also 45 C.F.R. § 263.1 (2005).
42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)(B)(i)(I) (2006).
Liz Schott, LaDonna Pavetti & Ife Finch, How States Have Spent Federal and State Funds Under the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Aug. 7, 2012), http://
www.cbpp.org/files/8-7-12tanf.pdf.
These four purposes are: “(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may
be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies;
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (a) (2006); see also Schott, Pavetti, & Finch, supra note 284, at 1 (explaining the requirement that expenditures promote one of the four TANF statutory purposes).
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federal TANF statute, they need not commingle the state funds with
federal TANF dollars for the expenditures to count towards the MOE
288
More importantly, the separate state expenditures
requirement.
are not subject to the same restrictions placed on federal TANF
funds, including PRWORA’s five-year bar and other mandatory alien
289
exclusions. A state is therefore not only free to maintain a separate,
solely state-funded benefit for which PRWORA-barred aliens are eligible, but state funding for such a benefit would also help win the
state federal TANF funds just as much as would commingling those
same state funds in a joint-funded TANF program.
Despite having the option to provide PRWORA-barred aliens
state-only assistance and have that assistance count towards the MOE
requirement, two-thirds of states (and the District of Columbia) pro290
vide no such assistance to QAs<5.
Only seven states provide such
291
assistance to any nonimmigrants.
2. Consequences of Commingling
The discretion to provide certain public benefits through solely
state-funded programs or through commingling state and federal
funds in joint-funded programs gives states several options for how to
spend state resources allocated to public welfare. The following example will summarize these options in the context of health-benefit
programs to illustrate three points: (1) channeling state funds into a
joint-funded benefit program without a separate provision for excluded aliens is a state-level alienage classification; (2) equal protection does not mandate equal levels of benefits between aliens and citizens; and (3) states can take advantage of federal funding while still
comporting with the Equal Protection Clause.
Consider a state that has $1 billion to provide medical assistance
to residents that it deems, based on non-suspect criteria, are in need
(e.g., low-income families, individuals with disabilities or blindness,
288
289

290

291

See 45 C.F.R. § 263.2(a) (2005) (noting that “[e]xpenditures of State funds in TANF or
separate State programs may count” if made for certain types of benefits or services).
Id.; see also Schott, Pavetti & Finch, supra note 284, at 29; Elizabeth Lower-Basch, TANF
Policy Brief: Guide to Use of Funds, CLASP 8 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.clasp.org/
resources-and-publications/files/Guide-to-Use-of-bTANF-Funds.pdf (noting that state expenditures qualify as MOE even when they assist families who are excluded from federalfunded TANF programs because of PRWORA).
DAVID KASSABIAN, ANNE WHITESELL & ERIKA HUBER, URBAN INST., WELFARE RULES
DATABOOK: STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2011 50–51 (2012), available at http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/412641-Welfare-Rules-Databook-2011.pdf.
Id. For instance, only nonimmigrants “with employment authorized by U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services are eligible for assistance” in Wisconsin. Id. at 51 n.12.
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etc.). I will call these residents the “in-need population.” Suppose
one million people comprise the in-need population and that ninety
percent of them are citizens, while ten percent are, for the sake of
simplicity in illustrating the point of this example, QAs<5. The state
thus has $1,000 per person to provide medical assistance to the inneed population and four options: (1) put the entire $1 billion in a
Medicaid program; (2) put $900 million in a Medicaid program and
$100 million in a solely state-funded health benefit program for qualified aliens; (3) fund Medicaid and the qualified-alien benefit such
that the levels of benefits in both programs are equal, even accounting for the federal government’s contribution into Medicaid; and (4)
put the entire $1 billion into a solely state-funded benefit for the entire in-need population (forgoing Medicaid entirely).
Under option 1, the state maximizes the total pool of funds available for providing medical assistance to the in-need population because it puts all of the state funds into a program that garners matching federal funds. If the state receives the minimum federal
292
matching rate, fifty percent, then $1 billion of state funds invested
in Medicaid would reap an additional $1 billion in federal funds for
the program. But maximizing the total size of the pie comes at the
cost of unequal distribution: The state’s resident citizens would receive a benefit valued at $2,222 per person, while its resident aliens
would receive no benefits.
Option 2 represents a pro-rata division of available state funds
among the in-need population. Ninety percent of the funds go into
Medicaid, benefitting the ninety percent of the population that are
citizens, while ten percent of the funds go into the solely state-funded
health-benefit program for the ten percent of the population that are
qualified aliens. The resident citizens still benefit from matching
federal funds, although to a slightly lesser degree ($900 million in
federal money, as opposed to the $1 billion under option 1). As
such, the resident citizens’ Medicaid benefits would be funded at
$2,000 per person. The resident aliens’ state-funded benefit would
be funded at $1,000 per person.
Option 3 is an equal-outcome scenario. If the state wants to provide its qualified aliens the same level of benefits that its resident citizens receive, then it must match the federal government’s per-person
contribution to Medicaid with additional funds for its qualified-alien
benefit. Where the federal contribution to Medicaid is a dollar-fordollar match, achieving equal benefits would require the state to ded292

See supra note 135.
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icate twice the amount of funds per person in the qualified-alien
293
benefit than in Medicaid. In this hypothetical, the state would put
$818,181,818 ($909.09 per resident citizen) into Medicaid and the
remainder in the qualified-alien benefit. Matching federal funds for
Medicaid would produce a benefit valued at $1,818.18 per person,
which would equal the benefit that qualified aliens received, albeit
solely from state funds.
Option 4 is also an equal-outcome scenario, but produces a lower
level of benefits than option 3. By forgoing Medicaid and its matching federal funds, the $1 billion in state funds would fund a $1,000per-person benefit for the entire in-need population. Qualified aliens would be no better off than they were under option 2, but citizens would be considerably worse off.
Option 1 effects a state-level alienage classification because the
state chooses to spend all of its available funds on a benefit program
that excludes aliens. Option 3 produces equal outcomes but has its
own potential constitutional difficulties. This spending choice constitutes preferential treatment of aliens over citizens and could be vul294
nerable to an Adarand-style equal protection challenge. Or it could
be challenged on preemption grounds because the separate, disproportionately funded state program for aliens would essentially negate
any effect of PRWORA to augment the level of public benefits received only by citizens (and certain aliens). Option 4 also produces
equal outcomes, and it comports with equal protection principles; yet
it fails to maximize the potential benefits for the entire in-need population.
Only option 2 maximizes the level of benefits under the parameters of comporting with equal protection and respecting Congress’s
policy of federal funds not benefitting certain aliens. The state makes
equal pro-rata contributions towards health benefits for its residents
irrespective of alienage, while the higher level of benefits that some
residents will receive is purely the result of a uniform federal policy.
This example shows that states can take advantage of federal matching funds, even if the award of such funds requires funneling state
293

294

See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Authority, 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1267
(Mass. 2011) (noting that “[d]ue to the level of Federal reimbursement, at least two federally eligible residents (citizens or federally eligible aliens) could be enrolled in Commonwealth Care for the same cost to the State as one member of the plaintiff class”).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (imposing a strict scrutiny
standard on an affirmative action program). See also Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096,
1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (considering Washington’s FAP program, which “provides benefits
exclusively to federally ineligible legal immigrants, while denying such benefits to citizens
and federally eligible qualified aliens”).
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money into a benefit program that excludes aliens, while still according its resident aliens and citizens equal protection of the law. It also
demonstrates that equal protection in this context does not signify
295
equal outcomes.
3. Remedying the Violation
Options for remedying equal protection violations that are the result of commingling state and federal funds depend on the benefitprogram context in which the funds are commingled. First, commingling is inherent to the reimbursement structure of Medicaid
programs and, as explained above, a state that forgoes Medicaid altogether would miss out on substantial federal funds for supporting its
in-need population. The best way for states to remedy the alienage
classification that they would otherwise effect through Medicaid participation is to fund separate, solely state-funded health-benefit programs for aliens. State contributions to both programs must be equal
on a pro-rata basis. These separate state programs would effectively
cure the constitutional defects that funding Medicaid without such
programs creates: The dedicating of greater state resources to the
benefit of in-need citizens than in-need aliens.
States have more flexibility in the TANF context because states
can receive federal TANF funds without having to commingle those
funds with state funds. And the segregated state funds nonetheless
count towards the level of MOE that states must achieve to qualify for
the federal funds, even if federally ineligible aliens (e.g., nonimmi296
grants and QAs<5) are benefitting from the state funds.
If states
want to continue to commingle MOE and federal TANF funds into a
single benefit program, they can follow the model of the Medicaid
remedy and create a separate, alien-only program supported by a level of MOE equal (on a pro-rata basis) to the MOE dedicated to the
joint-funded program.

295

296

See Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70, 77 (N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he right to equal protection
does not require the State to create a new public assistance program in order to guarantee equal outcomes under wholly separate and distinct public benefit programs. Nor
does it require the State to remediate the effects of PRWORA.”). But recognizing that citizens and aliens with equal levels of need are similarly situated before the state’s decision
to participate in Medicaid neither requires a state to “guarantee equal outcomes” nor
“remediate the effect of PRWORA.” Id. Indeed, resident citizens (and aliens not barred
under PRWORA) can continue to receive a higher level of benefits than similarly situated
aliens because, under the rule of Mathews, the federal government is free to deny aliens
federal support.
See supra notes 277–89 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, states can keep their MOE completely separate from
federal TANF funds. With this remedy, aliens and citizens alike
would benefit from the MOE funding streams, while only citizens
(and federally eligible aliens) would benefit from the federal TANF
funding stream as well. In either case, the state must ensure (1) that
it does not withhold MOE-funded benefits from a legally residing alien (whether qualified or nonimmigrant) on the basis of alienage,
and (2) that it excludes federally ineligible aliens from benefit programs supported by federal TANF funds.
CONCLUSION
The current mode of equal protection review of PRWORA-era
state decisions to deny aliens public benefits is inadequate. Some
courts avoid equal protection review altogether by applying a threshold analysis of whether the alien plaintiffs are similarly situated to a
class that has received favorable state treatment. Other courts merely
label the classification as “state” or “federal” and apply the accompanying standard of review. In both instances, courts ignore the underlying policy options that PRWORA and programs like Medicaid,
TANF, and CHIP leave open to the states, as well as how those options can vary depending on the particular statuses of the alien plaintiffs.
This Article has proposed that courts (1) abandon or at least modify their threshold similarly situated inquiries, (2) focus on the status
of the alien bringing the equal protection challenge, (3) determine
the public-benefit options available to states with regard to aliens of
that status, (4) look out for states adopting alienage classifications
through their participation in joint-funded benefit programs, and (5)
assess states’ funding decisions in light of their impacts on aliens and
citizens who are similarly in need of public benefits. With proper focus on these factors, courts can ensure that public-benefit schemes
meet the constitutional requirements outlined in Mathews and Graham. On one hand, this nuanced equal protection review will uphold
Congress’s prerogative, expressed through a uniform national policy
in PRWORA, to provide increased support (that is, support in excess
of what the states provide) for citizens and select aliens. On the other hand, it will hold state-level discriminatory treatment of aliens to
the strict-scrutiny standard that Graham requires.
Moreover, this Article has shown that aliens’ equal protection
rights are implicated not only by the termination of benefits that they
once received, but also through other, less-obvious state actions.
Such actions include blocking alien access to available federally sup-
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ported benefits, expanding joint-funded benefit programs for citizens
but not aliens, and choosing to commingle state and federal funds in
an alien-excluding benefit program without maintaining a separate
and equally state-funded benefit program for aliens.
These policy choices are far more common than the termination
of benefits that class actions have challenged to date. States should
voluntarily address these equal protection violations by adopting the
remedies outlined in Part IV. But if they do not, courts must apply
the searching review that the Equal Protection Clause requires. This
review will prevent states from using PRWORA as a shield for their
own policies of forcing a disenfranchised population to bear the
brunt of tightening welfare budgets.
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CHART 1 – ALIEN ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC BENEFITS UNDER PRWORA
Supplemental
Security
Income
Qualified
Alien
Arriving
Before
8/22/1996

Limited
1

Eligibility

Food
Stamps

Limited
Eligibility3

Medicaid

TANF

State

State
discretion

discretion

State or
Local
Benefit

State
discretion

Qualified
Alien
Arriving
after
8/22/1996
and
Having
Less than
5 Years

Ineligible;

Ineligible;

Military
eligible

Military
eligible

Ineligible;

Ineligible;

40Q work

40Q work
eligible;

State
discretion;
Ineligible

Ineligible

State

State
discretion;
40Q work
eligible;
Military
eligible

40Q work
eligible;
Military
eligible

Residency
Qualified
Alien
Arriving
after
8/22/1996
and
Having
More than
5 Years
Residency

eligible;
Military
eligible

Military
eligible

discretion;
40Q work
eligible;
Military
eligible

Nonimmigrant

Limited
eligibilty2

Ineligible

Emergency
Services
Only

Ineligible

NonQualified
Alien

Ineligible

Ineligible

Emergency
Services
Only

Ineligible

State
discretion;
40Q work
eligible;
Military
eligible

State
discretion
State
discretion4

Note: Chart based on, with modifications, ZIMMERMANN &
TUMLIN, supra n.36 at 15.
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“40Q work” means an alien who has worked or can be credited
with 40 qualifying quarters of coverage as defined under Title II of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and did not receive
federal means-tested benefits during those quarters of work.
“Military” means an alien who is a veteran or on active duty in the
armed forces, or a spouse or dependent child of such an alien.
1 – Qualified aliens who were receiving SSI before 8/22/1996, or
who are disabled or become disabled, are eligible. 40Q work and
Military are also eligible.
2 – PRUCOLs who were receiving SSI before 8/22/1996 are eligible.
3 – Only pre-1996 qualified aliens who are under eighteen years
old, disabled or blind, or were 65 years or older on 8/22/1996, are
eligible. 40Q work and Military are also eligible.
4 – 8 U.S.C. § 1621 makes non-qualified aliens ineligible, unless,
per § 1621(d), a state passes a law after 8/22/1996 that “affirmatively
provides for such eligibility.”

